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Summary findings
Campos and Pradhan examine how institLtional  to improve transparency and accountability, binding key
arrangements affect incentives that govern the size,  players to particular fiscal outcomes and making it costly
allocation, and use of budgetary resources. They uLse  a  for them to misbehave.
diagnostic questionnaire designed to elicit the relative  Systems in Indonesia and Thailand were reasonably
strengths and weaknesses of specific systems in terms of  effective in instilling fiscal discipline, but Indonesia
instilling fiscal discipline, strategically assigning spending  seemed to be somewhat better at allocating resources to
priorities, and making the best use of limited resources.  protect basic social services and alleviate poverty during
In applying their methodology to a sample of seven  periods of fiscal austerity. Thailand's overcentralized
countries (Australia, Ghana, Indonesia, Malawi, New  system did not capitalize on useful information from line
Zealand, Thailand, and Uganda), they also examine how  agencies and lower levels of government.
donor assistance affects expenditure outcomes.  Donors play a central role in spending outcomes in the
They first compare the far-reaching reforms  three African countries studied - Ghana, Malawi, and
introduced in Australia and New Zealand, two countries  Uganda. Donors provided incentives for short-term fiscal
at the cutting edge of institutional reform. In New  discipline, but the way they imposed spending cuts
Zealand, reform focused on achieving general fiscal  impeded the prioritizing of expenditures, and multiple
discipline and technical efficiency (getting the best  donor  projects fragmented the budget. Donor
output at the least cost). In ALstralia, reform focused on  conditionality on the composition  of expenditures, and
strategic priorities and a shift fromii  central to line  donor-driven  attempts to improve technical efficiency,
agencies to identify savings within hard budget  were ineffective. Lack of transparency and accountability
constraints. The two counltries took dramatically  meant that rules were not enforced and budgets were
different paths, but both sought to alter the incentives  often remade in an ad hoc, centralized way, so that the
that affect the siz(¢,  allocation, anid  use of resouirces,  and  flow of resources to line agencies was unpredictable.
This paper - a product of the Public Economics Division, Policy Research Department - is part of a larger effort in the
department to improve the allocationi  and ulse  of public expenditures. The studywas funded by the Bank's Research Support
Budget under  the research  project  "The  Impact of Budgetary  Institutionson  Expenditure  Outcomes"  (RPO 680-30).  Copies
of the paper are available free fromn  the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Cynthia
Bernardo, room  N 10-053.  teleplhone 202-473-1148,  fax 202-522-1154,  Internet  address cbernardo@worldbank.org.
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In this paper we examine how institutional arrangements affect incentives that govern the size, allocation and use of
budgetary  resources.  Out  objective is  to  identify key  arrangements that  create  incentives  consonant  with  and
supportive  of  achieving  better  expenditure  outcomes.  To  organize  our  approach,  we  categorize  institutional
arrangements  according  to  their  relative  impact  on  three  levels  or  categories  of  expenditure  outcomes-the
aggregate level of spending and the deficit (i.e., aggregate fiscal discipline), the composition of expenditures (i.e.,
strategic prioritization  for allocative efficiency and  equity), and  the  technical efficiency  in the use  of  budgeted
resources.
Using theories from the New  Institutional Economics  to guide us, we analyze three,  interrelated theoretical
problems  that plague any public  expenditure management  system (and  thus impinge on the  three categories of
expenditure outcomes).  Informed by practical public sector experience, we identify a  focused set of  institutional
arrangements that can potentially address one or more of these problems as well as corresponding mechanisms for
transparency  and  accountability which  can bind  key  players to  these arrangements.  We  construct a  diagnostic
questionnaire which, upon completion by a country expert, produces index values for each of the arrangement  and
mechanisms. On the basis of this construction, we are able to develop three parsimonious measures (i.e., "slack"
coefficients) of the potential effectiveness of a system with respect to each of the three expenditure categories. We
are then able to correlate these measures with actual expenditure outcomes. Moreover, we are able to assess the
relative strengths  and weaknesses of a  specific system and, in particular, can examine how donor assistance  can
enhance or undermine the effectiveness of these arrangements and mechanisms. We apply this methodology to a
sample of seven countries.
Through our methodology, we are able to capture the principal changes that the radical reforms in New Zealand
and Australia  introduced.  We are  able to  show that the  New  Zealand  reforms have  been  geared to  achieving
aggregate  fiscal discipline and enhancing technical efficiency, and that formal mechanisms for transparency  and
accountability have been central  to these reforms. The data reveal that our measures,  the slack coefficients,  are
correlated with expenditure outcomes (e.g., reduction in fiscal discipline and unit costs of service  delivery). Our
slack coefficients for Australia confirm that the thrust of the reforms was to focus attention on strategic priorities
and a significant shift away from central to line agencies as the source of savings in order to achieve aggregate fiscal
targets. The result has been a dramatic reduction in the level of spending and deficits, and more significantly, large
churnings in the composition of spending of a highly activity-specific nature.
Our analysis for Thailand and Indonesia reveals that both countries have systems that are reasonably effective
in instilling aggregate fiscal discipline. However, the Indonesian system places greater emphasis on prioritization,
which is manifested in its ability to protect basic social services during fiscal austerity. By contrast, Thailand's  is an
overly centralized system, which does not capitalize on the superior information at line agencies and lower levels of
government.
Two key  factors  affect expenditure outcomes  in our three African countries--Ghana, Uganda  and  Malawi--
albeit to varying degrees. The first is the central role of donors. While donor assistance has provided incentives for
short-term aggregate fiscal discipline, it has also impeded expenditure prioritization because of the manner in which
expenditure  cuts  have  been  imposed.  Moreover,  multiple  donor  projects  have  fragmented  the  budget.  Donor
conditionality on  the broader  composition  of  expenditures has not  been effective,  nor  have  been  donor  driven
attempts to improve technical efficiency. A second feature is the lack of transparency and accountability  in these
systems, resulting in poor enforceability of existing rules. Budgets are often remade during budget implementation
in  an  ad  hoc,  centralized  manner,  resulting  in  large  deviations  from  the  approved  budget  and  tremendous
unpredictability in the flow of resources to line agencies.
Using our findings, we are able to critique recent initiatives being undertaken in the three African countries, and
propose reform experiments that can improve incentives within client governments as well as between governments
and  donors. Monitoring and evaluating these reform experiments constitutes a principal element of the proposed
agenda for further research.Introduction
In  recent  years,  there  has  been  heightened  concern  about  poor  fiscal  outcomes  in  developing  countries.
Governments  have  had  to  reduce  aggregate  public  spending  and  deficits  due  to  serious  macroeconomic
imbalances.  At the same time, governments  had  to focus attention on the composition  of spending  in deciding
where  to cut  expenditures.  While  everyone  attempted  fiscal adjustment,  few  succeeded.  Fiscal  outcomes  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa have been particularly  disappointing.  A recent  review  of adjustment  in Africa concluded
that over 60 percent  of the countries had poor  or very poor fiscal stance, defined  in terms of sustainable  budget
deficits  (World  Bank  1994).  Further,  recent  reviews  suggest  that  there  are  egregious  imbalances  in  the
composition  of public  spending, and only a few African countries  have made some progress  in improving  the
allocative  efficiency  and  equity  of  expenditure  composition  (Pradhan  1996,  World  Bank  1992).  Finally,
evidence from  several countries points  to gross technical inefficiency  in the use of expenditures,  manifested  in
widespread  incidence  of "ghost"  workers,  moonlighting,  collapse  in the  delivery  of basic  services  (Lindauer
and Nunberg  1994, World Bank  1992).
Broadly, two types of advice have been offered to address these problems.  Thb first is reflected  in the
increasing  emphasis  that  the World Bank  and  other donors  have been placing  on evaluatiug  and  influencing
the  level  and composition  of expenditures.  The Bank  has been devoting  substantial  resources  to carrying  out
Public Expenditure  Reviews  (PERs)  to evaluate  public expenditure  allocations.  The basic presumption  is that
rigorous  economic  analysis  can be  used  to identify  expenditure  imbalances,  and  that  this  can help  introduce
conditionalities  in adjustment  and sectoral  loans that improve  expenditure  outcomes.  While  PERs  have helped
improve the composition  of expenditures  in some countries (Pradhan  1996), they generally  have not had much
of  an  impact.  For  instance,  two  recent  reviews  of  PERs,  including  an  external  review  of  PERs  in African
countries,  concluded  that  PERs  have  not  been  internalized  within  governments,  and  have  not  succeeded  in
influencing  the government's  budget process or expenditure  allocations  (Netherlands  Economic  Institute  1995,
World Bank  1995).
A key problem  is that PERs have typically not focused on evaluating and  improving the budgeting  system
in client countries  (Pradhan  1996). Most recently,  the Africa region of the World Bank, has issued  guidelines
requiring  PERs  to do precisely  this-focus  on building  government  capacity,  improving  the  budget  process
and  more  generally  strengthening  public  expenditure  management  systems  in client  countries  (World  Bank
1995). But this in fact has been the emphasis  of the second type of advice.
The  second  approach  emerges  from  the  public  sector  budgeting  and  financial  management  literature
(Wholey  1978; United  Nations  1992; Rabin  and  Lynch  1983; Wesberry  1993). This  literature  is extensive,
covering  documentation  of formal budgetary  processes,  technical  analysis  of financial  management  systems,
and  evaluation  of  the  appropriateness  of  government  organizational  structures.  The  advice  it  offers  is
manifested  predominantly  in technical  assistance  projects  to developing  countries  to strengthen  the  financial
management  system  (e.g.,  computer-based  information  systems  to  improve  financial  accounting),  revamp
budgetary  formats,  restructure  organizational  responsibilities,  and  strengthen  government  capacity  (e.g.,
manpower  training).
While  this approach  offers some  useful building  blocks  for improving public  expenditure  management,  it
has  two  principal  shortcomings.  First,  it  does  not  have  a  coherent  analytical  framework  with  which  to
systematically  evaluate weaknesses  and strengths  of a public expenditure  management  system.  Second,  it does
not  offer  any  methodology  for  clearly  linking  changes  in  a  system  with  expenditure  outcomes,  or
understanding  interrelationships  among the three levels of outcomes.
Our  research  attempts  to develop  a  new  approach  whose  emphasis  is on  examining  how  institutional
arrangements  (i.e.,  the rules, norms, procedures)  goveming  the budget  process  affect incentives  governing  the
allocation  and  use of resources.  Using  theories from the new  institutional  economics  to guide us,  we identify
key theoretical  problems  that underpin any public expenditure  management  system. We then construct  a set of
generic  institutional  arrangements  each of which  can potentially  address one  or more of the problems  and link
with  each  arrangement  relevant  accountability  and/or  transparency  enhancing  mechanisms.  We  categorize
these  arrangements  and  mechanisms  according  to  their  relative  impact  on  three  levels  or  categories  of
expenditure  outcomes-the  aggregate  level  of spending  and  the deficit, the composition  of expenditures,  and
2the technical efficiency in the use of budgeted resources. On the basis of this categorization, we are able to
develop a parsimonious measure of the potential effectiveness of a system with respect to each of the three
expenditure categories  which we are then able to use to correlate the "quality" of public expenditure systems
with expenditure  outcomes.
As part of this  research, we sought to examine lessons from countries that have been  successful in
undertaking reforms to  their public  expenditure management systems  and  have  experienced improved
outcomes: what kinds of institutional arrangements should we be looking for? The most widely-publicized
examples have come from the OECD countries that have embarked on a wave of budgetary innovations.
Reviews of budget reforms in OECD reforms pointed to New Zealand and Australia as being at the cutting
edge of these reform efforts, each overhauling the incentive structure goveming expenditure allocation and
utilization (Aucoin 1990; Scott, Bushnell and Salee 1990). The reviews indicate that the two countries have
been  successful in slashing expenditures and deficits. They do  not however discuss the  impact on  the
composition of expenditures or on technical efficiency. Indeed, there has been no attempt to systematically
analyze the specific elements of these reforms, identify what they sought to achieve, and evaluate their impact
on the different levels of expenditure outcomes. Consequently, we chose to focus on the New Zealand and
Australian experiences. Specifically, we  use  their experience to help  us  understand better the  kinds  of
institutional arrangements that can address the key theoretical problems and the potential impact that these
arrangements can have on expenditure  outcomes.
Since there are vast differences  in institutional  context between the OECD and the developing economies,
we also sought to examine the public expenditure  management system of two successful developing countries
in East Asia, Thailand and Indonesia.  These countries have exercised  remarkable  aggregate fiscal discipline,  as
evidenced by sustained, relatively low inflation rates, while achieving rapid and broad-based growth (World
Bank 1993). However, some evidence suggests that Indonesia has been better at allocating expenditures to
basic social services and more generally  to poverty alleviation.
Finally, we  selected three  countries in Africa-Ghana,  Uganda and  Malawi-to  help  us  understand
institutional arrangements in countries with poor outcomes, including the impact of donor assistance, and to
investigate  whether we could apply the lessons from the more successful countries in these contexts.
This paper is divided into six sections. In section II, we present the analytical framework and identify the
key institutional  arrangements  that define the parameters  of a public expenditure  management system. We also
construct indices to represent each of the key institutional  arrangements and we show how the indices can be
used to derive three measures of the potential  effectiveness of a system with respect to the three categories of
expenditure outcomes. In section III, we describe the pre and post reform systems of New Zealand and
Australia, apply the methodology developed in section II to derive the measures of potential effectiveness for
each system, and correlate  changes in these measures  with changes in expenditure outcomes. We also compare
the two post reform systems. In section IV, we use the methodology to characterize the public expenditure
management systems of Thailand and Indonesia and evaluate how our characterization corresponds to the
performance of these countries on aggregate fiscal discipline and the composition of expenditures. In section
V, we describe the broad characteristics of the systems in Uganda, Ghana, and Malawi and illustrate how
donor arrangements affect the potential of the systems to achieve better expenditure outcomes. We end the
section with a critique of recent reform initiatives in these countries. We conclude the paper with a brief
discussion of future directions for research  in this relatively  nascent area.
The Analytical Framework
Understanding the intricacies of a  country's public expenditure management system is a  complicated and
demanding task.  In this paper, we attempt to unravel the complications  that arise in constructing an effective
public  expenditure  management  system,  to  present  a  methodology  for  characterizing  the  system
parsimoniously  without  losing  its  essential  features,  and  to  undertake  some  correlations  of  system
characterizations  and expenditure outcomes. To organize our approach, we categorize expenditure outcomes
according to three basic objectives that any system needs to achieve: (i) to instill aggregate  fiscal  discipline,
3(ii) to facilitate  strategic prioritizationi  of expenditures  across  programns ansd  projects,  and  (iii) to encourage
technical efficiency  in the use of budgeted  r esources,  i.e. achieve outputs at the lowest possible cost.
Three distinct  but interrelated theoretical  problems  impinge on the task of achieving  the above  objectives.
The first has  to do with  what  is known  as the  tragedy of  the commons.  Disparate  claimants  on government
spending  view  the  budget  as  a  common  resource  pool  which  they  can  dip  into with  little  or  no  cost.  The
second  pertains  to  information  revelation  and  "vote  cycling"  problems  that  primarily  impede  the  strategic
prioritization  of  expenditures  across  sectors  and  programs.  The  third  involves  information  asymmetry  and
incentive incompatibilities  within the government  hierarchy (e.g., the principal-agent  relationship  between  the
central  and line ministries)  which  can impede  the efficient  allocation  and  use of budgeted  resources.  Each of
these problems  can  affect  expenditure  outcomes  adversely.  Each  is inherently  difficult  to  resolve.  Together
they present a formidable task.
To guide  us in our analysis, we use theories from the new institutional  economics  to help  us identify key
institutional  arrangements  that  can  help  address  these  problems.  We  describe  each  of  these  arrangements,
explain briefly  how they  work, and indicate  why they can help resolve  one or more of these problems.  From
this, we  are then  able  to piece  together  a  set of  institutional  arrangemenits that  can  potentially  make  for an
effective  public expenditure  management  system.
Institutional  arrangements  however  need  not  necessarily  have  any  effect.  For  them  to  be  binding,
mechanisms  that  make adherence  or  non-adherence  to these rules  transparent  and  that hold  the  govemment
and  its  ministries  accountable  for  bad  performance  are  necessary.  Transparency  and  accountability
mechanisms  impose  implicit  costs on politicians  and bureaucrats  for violating  rules  and  thus can make  their
commitment  to the rules credible.
Aggregate Fiscal Discipline and the Tragedy of the Commons
Aggregate  fiscal discipline  is impeded  by the so-called  tragedy of the commons.  There  are many claimants  to
the budget  , e.g., interest groups,  legislators, line ministries.  Each has different  preferences  over the manner  in
which  the  budget  is  to  be  allocated,  i.e.  the  composition  of  spending,  and  each  exerts  pressure  on  the
govemment  to bias  spending  in the direction of  their preferences.  Given  taxes are collected  from  the general
public, the tax burden of a claimant's  spending priorities, which  is spread  across many groups and individuals,
is likely to be  considerably  lower  than the  total social  cost of  the implied programs.  On  the  other hand,  the
benefits accrue  mostly to the claimant. Consequently,  a claimant  will always demand a level of spending on its
desired  programs  that  exceeds  the  level  that  is  socially  optimal.l  For  these  reasons,  constraints  on  the
aggregate  level  of  spending  and  deficits  over  the  medium  term  become  important.  Absent  any  constraint,
meeting  the demands  of disparate  claimants  is likely to result in large,  unsustainable  deficits  that translate  into
an  unstable  macroeconomic  environment-high  inflation,  high  interest  rates,  burgeoning  current  account
deficits-which  can ultimately retard growth.2
Key institutional  arrangements that can help mitigate the tragedy  of the commons,  together  with associated
transparency  and accountability  mechanisms  are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
Institutional arrangements  Accountability  Transparency
A. Macro framework and coordination mechanism  Ex-post reconciliation  Published
B. Dominance of central ministries  Sanctions  Made public
C. Formal constraints  Openness of financial markets  Freedom of the press
D. Hard budget constraints
E. Comprehensiveness of budget
I  See Shepsle, Weingast, and Johnsen (  1981) for a more detailed discussion of this  issue.
2  This is consistent with the observation that macroeconomic crisis generally induces governments to confront and scale down the deficit
(Haggard and Kaufman).
4The  tragedy  of  the  commons  problem  can be  mitigated  by  introducing  a medium-term  macroeconomic
framework  into discussions  of the  budget,  granting  the  central  ministries  a  dominant  position  on  decisions
conceming  aggregate  spending,  and  by  establishing  formal  constraints  on  spending  and  borrowing.  A
macroeconomic  framework  provides  a basis for evaluating  the implications  of the public  expenditure  program
for macroeconomic  variables and  gives the govemrnent  a means to have claimants  incorporate  the real  cost of
inflation as well as implied changes in other macro variables  into their decision  calculus.  It would be important
however  for  all public  expenditures,  including  extrabudgetary  funds,  to be  included  in the  macroeconomic
framework;  in Ukraine  in 1991 for instance,  extrabudgetary  funds accounted  for about  12 percent  of GDP  and
were  not incorporated  in the macro  framework.  To  be effective,  the  macroeconomic  framework  needs  to be
supported  by underlying  institutional  arrangements  which ensure coordination  among the key central  agencies.
For  example  in Thailand,  the  four  central  agencies-the  Central  Bank, the  Budget  Bureau,  the  Ministry  of
Finance and the Planning  Ministry-work  closely to develop and monitor an intemally  consistent  set of macro
aggregates.
Line  ministries  and  other  claimants  have  relatively  parochial  views  on  the  budget.  By  virtue  of  their
mandates  and jurisdictions,  the central  ministries  are better able to evaluate  the big picture of which  aggregate
spending  and macroeconomic  trends  are major  components.  Hence,  the tragedy  of the commons  can  also be
mitigated  by granting  the central  ministries  dominance  over aggregate  spending.  In Thailand,  for instance,  the
four central  agencies  have  had  considerable  autonomy  and authority  in setting aggregate  fiscal targets;  there
have  been  only  two years  in the  last  few decades  where  the  Cabinet  or the  Parliament  has  overridden  their
targets.
Given  the nature  of politics  in many  countries  however  this may  not be  enough.  There  will be  constant
pressure  from claimants  to expand the budget  envelope.  Establishing  explicit rules  that  put specific  limits on
spending  and  borrowing  and  that  impose  penalties  on1  overspending  by  line  ministries  can  give  the  central
ministries  more  leverage  over claimants,  i.e. increase  their bargaining  power.  In practical  terms  this  means
central ministries  can refer to objective,  pre-determined  rules to defend  their decisions.  Similarly,  Indonesia's
constitutional  "balanced  budget"  law prohibits the government from incurring any domestic  borrowing.
In  theory  then  aggregate  fiscal  discipline  will  depend  upon:  (i)  the  existence  of  a  medium-term
expenditure  framework  based  upon  a  consistent  macroeconomic  program;  (ii)  the relative  dominance  of  the
central  ministries;  and  (iii)  the existence  of  formal constraints  on  spending  and  the  deficits.  But  while  such
rules  may  exist  on  paper,  they  may  not  be  binding.  The  a  llowing  mechanisms  can  help  improve
accountability  and/or  transparency  and  thus  impose  political  costs  on  politicians  and  bureaucrats  from
violating  the  rules:  (i)  reconciliation  between  ex-ante  and  ex-post  aggregate  spending  and  deficits;  (ii)
sanctions  against  overspending;  (iii)  publication  and  dissemination  of  the  results  to  the  public;  and  (iv)
integration  of all expenditures  within the budget, including  extrabudgetary  funds. New Zealand  offers the most
dramatic  example  of  accountability  and  transparency  mechanisms  which  binds  the  government  to aggregate
fiscal  discipline.  The  contract  of  the  govemor  of  the Central  Bank  is explicitly  linked  to  inflation,  and  the
contract  of  the  Minister  of  Finance  is  linked  to  aggregate  fiscal  performance.  Further,  the  government  is
legally required  to commit itself to aggregate  fiscal targets, and is legally bound  to full and frequent  disclosure.
Open  financial  markets  have  exerted  a  disciplining  force  with  the  publication  of  this  data.  Similarly,
Indonesia's  balanced  budget  law  does  not  by  itself  exert  a  binding  influence  because  while  it  prohibits
domestic  borrowing,  it  allows  extemal  borrowing;  extemal  discipline  is  in  fact  exerted  by  open  capital
accounts in Indonesia.
Indeed,  the  openness  offi nancial  markets  represents  a subtle  mechanism  that imposes  accountability  on
the  govemment  for maintaining  aggregate  fiscal  discipline.  Open  financial  markets  can  potentially  act as  a
disciplining  device on the government  even in the absence of other mechanisms.  If the government  decides to
run  a  large  deficit,  institutional  investors  and  fund  managers  may  perceive  this  to  imply  macroeconomic
problems  down the road, e.g., inflation,  devaluation,  etc. and thus may decide to pull their funds out and move
them  to other countries.  Should  this happen then the government  is likely to confront  a macroeconomic  crisis,
which  would  likely  have  serious  political  repercussions.  In short,  open  financial  markets  make  it politically
costly  for the  government  to run  a large deficit.  Indeed,  our preliminary  explorations  into this  issue  suggests
that more open  financial markets tend to reduce the relative size of budget deficits  (deficit to GDP ratio). Iabl
52  presents our econometric  results based on two different  measures  of financial openness,  APTALP,  which  is
based on the  international  arbitrage pricing  model, and ICAPALP,  which  is based on the capital  asset pricing
model.3 The control  variables  are the per capita  GDP growth  rate  (G),  a measure  of  the sustainability  of the
deficit (INT), an index for the adherence to the rule of law (CON),  and an index of political instability  (POL).
Annex  A  presents  our preliminary  econometric  results  on  the  impact  of  openness  of  financial  markets  on
budget deficits  in further detail.
Strategic Prioritization, Transactions Costs, and Consensus Building
Given  aggregate  fiscal discipline,  the  second  key  challenge  is how  to prioritize  competing  claims  on scarce
resources.  Once  again,  the underlying  problem  is the tragedy  of the commons  which  creates a tension  among
competing  claims  from  individuals  and  groups.  But  there  are  two  additional  problems  which  make
piioritization  difficult:  high transactions  costs in getting feedback  to and from  civil society  about how  to map
expenditures  onto preferences;  and information  asymmetries within the government  hierarchy  characterized  by
the  fact  that  line  agencies  possess  better  information  about  how  best  to  allocate  expenditures  within  their
mandates.
Prioritization  is  fundamentally  a  political  process.  Politicians  will  set  priorities  based  upon  their
understanding  of  the  preferences  of  their  constituencies:  The  key  here  is  whether  there  are  institutional
arrangements  that  improve  the  quality  of  information  needed  to  do  this  effectively.  Key  institutional
arrangements  and  their  associated  transparency  and  accountability  mechanisms,  which  can  facilitate
prioritization  are summarized  in Table 3.
Table 2. Dependent Variable:  Deficits as Percent of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  -6.082  -5.007  -7.714  -7.963
(  -1I.65)**(-  (-  (-2.17)* *
G  -0.083  -0.149  -0.065  -0.079
(-0.706)  (-138)***  (-0.54)  (-0.66)
INT  -0.008  -0.009  -0.008  -0.009
(-3.59)*  (-4.23)*  (-3.77)*  (-3.82)*
CON  2.243  1.776  2.61  2.596
(1.51)**  (1.32)***  (1.72)**  (1.72)**
POL  0.286  0.608  0.943  1.192
(0.32)  (0.73)  (1.05)***  (1.29)***








R-Squared  0.474  0.577  0.443  0.457
No. of Observations  54  54  54  54
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses; * indicates significant at the 1% level, *  at the 5% level,  and  *  at the  10% level.
3  These measures have been developed by Levine and Zervos (1995).
6Table 3. Prioritization  for Allocative  Efficiency and Equity
Institutional arrangements  Accountability  Transparency
A. System for comparing medium-term costs  Reporting on outcomes  Published
of competing policies
B. Comprehensiveness of the budget  Ex-post evaluations  Freedom of the press
C. Flexibility of line agencies  Hard budget constraint  Made public
D. Breadth of consultations  Technical capacity of parliament  Comprehensible
E. Use of objective criteria
Invariably  the  tragedy  of  the commons  will create  demands  in excess  of the  constraints.  This  raises  the
transactions  costs  of  collective  decision  making  within  the political  process  because  it creates  a  situation  in
which  individuals  and groups will strive to restructure  coalitions in order to enlarge  their share of a fixed pie.4
This implies  the need for institutional arrangements  that help build consensus  among  the competing  groups  on
the relative expenditure  allocations.5
Consensus  building  requires  information  on what  trade-offs  are being  made,  including  what  everyone  is
having  to give up and  gain,  together with a vision  of  future benefits  that will derive  from  current  sacrifices.
Thus  for priontization,  the most  important  arrangement  is likely  to be  a process  which  articulates  and  seeks
consensus  over  strategic  outcomes  that  expenditures  seek  to  achieve  in  the  medium  term  and  that  links
expenditure  allocations  with  these  strategic  outcomes.  This  could  include,  for  instance,  a  decision-making
mechanism  in Cabinet  to  decide  upoin strategic  priorities  informed  by a  system  for comparing  the  medium-
temi costs of competing  policies within a given hard budget  constraint.
Line  ministries  have better  information  on how  best to allocate  resources  within  their sectors  to achieve
given  objectives.  Consequently,  a complementary  arrangement  that  would  economize  on  transactions  costs
would be to give them the flexibility  to determine what new programs to introduce and what  existing programs
to cut, i.e. allocating  resources within their ceilings, economizes  on the cost of information.  For as long as line
ministries  can be held accountable  for their performance  (through  reconciliations  and ex-post  evaluations)  and
their  performance  is made transparent,  they will tend  to use  the  information  they possess  (but which  central
ministries  and politicians  do not) to allocate their ceilings to achieve their given objectives.
Australia  offers the best example  of such a priority setting process.  The process engenders  strong  focus on
strategic  outcomes  that  expenditure  programs  are  seeking  to  achieve,  and  incorporates  a  medium-term
expenditure  framework  that link allocations  to the  achievement  of  these outcomes.  At the  Cabinet  level,  the
process  focuses  on evaluating  and  setting strategic  priorities  based  upon medium-cost  estimates  of  spending
and  savings  options  identified  by line agencies  as well as by Cabinet. Line ministries  are given  a hard budget
constraint  consistent  with these intersectoral  priorities, but then given flexibility  to reallocate  resources  within
their  portfolios.  These  medium-term  costs  of policies,  called  forward  estimates,  are  rolled  over  into  future
budgets  provided  policies  do not change.  This lowers transactions  costs and  helps focus attention  on changes
in strategic  priorities. Accountability  is achieved through  the hard constraint,  reporting on results or outcomes,
a strong emphasis  on ex-post  reconciliations  and evaluations.  Australia,  for instance,  publishes a reconciliation
table  with  its budget  showing  the  deviations  between  last year's  forward  estimates  and this  year's  proposed
allocations.  This  is accompanied  by  an  explanation  of  the  observed  deviations.  Australia  also  undertakes
systematic  ex post evaluations of its programs.  Among developing  countries,  Colombia  is launching  the most
ambitious  program  of ex-post  evaluations, and Malawi is attempting  to institute a priority-setting  process along
the lines of Australia.
A credible  priority-setting  process  also requires  that all expenditures  are incorporated  into the budget.  In
other  words,  the  budget  needs  to  be  comprehensive.  The  existence  of  extra  budgetary  funds  and/or  the
4  Theoretically this refers to the problem of "vote" cycling (see McKelvey 1976).
5  On the US.  Congress, see Weingast (1993), Krehbiel (1991), Shepsle (1979), and Shepsle and Weingast (1994).
7exclusion of certain expenditure categories, e.g., subsidies to public enterprises, is likely to weaken the ability
of  decision-makers to  allocate expenditures to  achieve  strategic outcomes. For  instance, considerable
earmarking of resources for particular expenditures in several Latin American countries (e.g., Colombia)
effectively removes large chunks of expenditures from the prioritization process. Comprehensiveness  or unity
of the budget is perhaps the second most important  arrangement  for prioritization.
There is also a need to establish impersonal  rules for evaluating the relative importance  of programs and
projects to complement the prioritization process. Since impersonal  rules apply equally to every program and
project, the govemment  cannot be as easily accused  of favoritism  and thus is better able to defend itself against
criticism. The use of economic cost-benefit analysis and incidence analysis are examples of such rules. The
first can provide information on the net social gain, while the second can potentially make transparent who
gains and who loses. These rules can thereby help claimants evaluate tradeoffs more objectively and thus
arrive at agreements  more quickly.
To build a consensus, the decision  making process also needs to extract information about the preferences
of different claimants, i.e. determine the demand curve. Decisions have to be made about broad strategic
priorities for this determines ministerial  objectives, ceilings, and allocations  over the medium term. But again
asymmetries in information  between the government  and claimants make this difficult. Consequently, there is
a  need for  institutional arrangements which lower the costs of transmitting the information about social
preferences  to government  and thus in detenmining  broad strategic priorities. 6
Broad consultations that involve representatives  of claimants and that incorporate feedback and provide
oversight at relatively low transactions  cost can help arrive  at strategic priorities.  The most extensive, tractable
form of such consultations is likely to involve parliamentary discussions of the budget. Parliamentarians
represent some segment of  the population as well  as certain  interest groups. Moreover, parliamentary
committees and subcommittees generally evaluate specific components of the overall public expenditure
program. So by exposing proposed public expenditure allocations  to parliamentary scrutiny, feedback can be
obtained on the appropriateness  of the priorities  and adjustments  made accordingly.
In  some  countries,  corporatist  arrangements tend  to  complement if  not  dominate  parliamentary
procedures. 7 In such cases, representatives from various sectors in society become an important sounding
board of the government. It is helpful if not necessary to create a forum through which these representatives
can comment and criticize budget proposals. 8 In any case, opinion surveys can help identify broad priorities
which discussions with Parliament  and/or representatives  of corporatist groups can refine.
Critical to the success of the demand revealing (and thus consensus  building) mechanisms is a set of rules
or criteria which introduces  incentives for "shared sacrifice",  i.e. claimants agree to smaller allocations within
a constrained  budget envelope. This suggests the need for commitment  devices that insure claimants that their
current sacrifices will result in future benefits and that each one will bear some part of the burden. 9 Hence,
mechanisms that  hold  govenument accountable for  allocating resources accordingly and  making  those
allocations transparent become important. Unless claimants can be sure that the government will indeed
allocate resources accordingly they will be much less willing to support any proposed allocation, reducing the
likelihood  that a consensus  can be reached.
Consensus building is really about creating institutional  arrangements  for claimants and the government  to
exploit potential gains from trade, i.e. logrolling.  Hence, for a consensus to emerge, arrangements  that address
logrolling problems are needed. There is by now a considerable  literature on this in the context of the United
States (see Shepsle and Weingast, 1994 for a literature  survey). However much of this discussion is premised
6  In practice what this has usually meant is for the Cabinet  LO propose ministerial ceilings and intraministerial allocations and for broad
consultations  to inform Cabinet of changes that need to be made to confrom more closely to preferences of claimants from civil society.
7  See Staniland (1985) for a definition and discusson of Corporatism.
8  In Malaysia  for example,  the Budget Dialogue Group which consists of rrepresentatives from all major sectors  including NGOs and
industry groups, meets annually to discuss budget priorities for the coming year and to comment on the previous year's  allocations.
9  See Campos and Esafahani (1995) and Campos and Root (I 995)for a discussion of this issue.
8on the fact that individuals  and groups are willing to behave according to the rules of the game. In much of the
developing  world, this cannot be presumed.  The rules are not very transparent and public officials are not held
sufficiently accountable for their actions. Hence, politicians and public officials have very little incentive to
behave according to the rules. This of course makes trades among different parties difficult since it creates an
environment  in which individuals  may renege on agreements without fear of being penalized.
Increasing transparency and improving accountability make it more costly for politicians and public
officials to violate rules and thus renege on agreements. Publishing  the expenditure allocations and the agreed
upon (i.e., strategic) outcomes embodied in the expenditure  plan and publicizing these (i.e. making the budget
transparent)  make it more difficult for both politicians  and officials to alter things midstream without sufficient
cause since they will have to defend any such action before the general public. Institutionalizing  a process of
reconciling  actual expenditures  of ministries with their annual budgeted allocations as well as reconciling their
forward estimates with subsequent budget requests and publicizing all such reconciliations will induce the
government  to stick to the expenditure  priorities (except when there are large exogenous shocks and even then
the government will have to provide a good explanation). Moreover, undertaking regular ex-post evaluations
of major ministerial programs and publicizing  the results makes line ministries more responsive to producing
the outputs that they have promised to produce over the medium term period.
Closely linked to the above transparency  and accountability  mechanisms is the need to provide Parliament
with sufficient resources to hire and maintain a  staff with the technical capacity to evaluate government
programs and proposals. If Parliament  can adequately scrutinize  government  performance  then the government
will be under more pressure to deliver  on what it has promised in the expenditure  plan.
In  summary, institutional arrangements which  can facilitate prioritization include (i)  an expenditure
planning  process linked to the achievement  of affordable outcomes, including  a process to identify and discuss
the medium-term costs of competing priorities at the Cabinet level; (ii) flexibility for line agencies to make
intrasectoral allocations; (iii) comprehensiveness  of the budget; (iv) a process that allows feedback from
claimants that inform priority setting, and (v) the use of objective criteria. Accountability and transparency
mechanisms which can help  bind the politicians and bureaucrats to  the achievement of  these strategic
outcomes include (i)  reconciliation of ex-ante and  ex-post allocations; (ii) reconciliation of budgetary
allocations with forward estimates; (iii) reconciliation of ex-ante and ex-post outcomes, including ex-post
evaluations;  (iv) public dissemination  of the results; (v) hard budget constraint to create incentives  to prioritize
expenditures; (v) integration of all expenditures (e.g., extrabudgetary  funds) into budgetary deliberations, and
(vi) building the technical capacity  of Parliament.
Technical Efficiency  and Incentive Incompatibilities
Assuming an aggregate level and a prioritization of expenditures emerges from the above arrangements, there
still remains the principal agent problem within the government hierarchy.  Information asymmetries and
incentive incompatibilities  can impede the efficient delivery of public services by line agencies and their civil
servants. Because of their closeness to the clients and their involvement in day-to-day operations in a specific
sector or  subsector, line  ministries and  their agencies possess superior information about  how  best  to
implement programs to achieve the intended results.  It thus becomes imperative for the government to grant
the line ministries sufficient degree of managerial  autonomy over the specific allocations and the responsibility
to implement  their respective  budgets.
The capacity of line agencies for efficient delivery of services depends also on the predictability of the
flow of budgetary resources. Unless a line agency can be certain of how much it is going to get over the fiscal
year, it will not be able to make definite plans and therefore cannot make efficient  allocations. For instance, in
several African  countries, the  budget  is  remade during the  year,  and  line  agencies  face considerable
uncertainty in making their expenditure plans for the fiscal year. At the opposite extreme, the expenditure
process in Australia with its requirement of automatically folding forward estimates (absent major policy
changes) of line agencies into their annual budgets introduces  a high degree of predictability.
Managerial autonomy and predictability  will not produce desirable results unless the civil service in line
agencies attracts competent individuals. A necessary requisite to do this is adequate compensation. In this
9regard, among the more critical arrangements is a compensation scheme that closely aligns public sector with
private  sector compensation. However this  arrangement needs  to  be  complemented by  a  merit  based
recruitment and promotion system. Without such a system, competency will not be rewarded appropriately
which will affect the morale and thus the incentives  of civil servants. The worst case scenario is one in which
promotions and recruitment are based solely on political connections and influence. In such cases, high
salaries will tend to go to those who are most well connected and civil servants will tend to concentrate on
establishing  such connections  rather than on accomplishing  their tasks efficiently.
Autonomy and competence of line agencies are necessary but not sufficient for technical efficiency.
Indeed, there is no guarantee that the line ministries, despite their superior information, will implement their
budgeted programs in ways that will achieve  the intended  results at the lowest  possible cost. They could just as
wvell  use their budget inappropriately, e.g., for  ,ersonal or parochial gain. Hence, they have to be made
accountable for the  allocational decisions th,a they make, and  for the efficient delivery of services. An
appropriate balance between autonomy and accountability  of the line agencies has to be struck. Accountability
will depend upon (i) publication of financial accounts and with what lags; (ii) publication of financial audits
and with what lags; (iii) the extent of oversight of financial  accounts and audits by groups in civil society (e.g.,
Parliamentary  sub-committees);  (iv) clarity of outputs of organizational  units; (v) contestability in the delivery
of outputs; (vi) tenure of agency heads; (vii) implicit or explicit performance contracts for agency heads and
their employees; (viii) extent of performance audits and their publication;  and (ix) the use of client surveys.
The publication and general dissemination  of their results, i.e., making them transparent,  will contribute further
to the effectiveness  of these arrangements.
New Zealand offers the most dramatic example of institutional  reforms to achieve technical efficiency.
Permanent secretaries in line agencies have been removed and replaced by chief executives on fixed-term,
output-based  contracts. The budget is based upon the appropriation  of outputs rather than inputs, and the move
to accrual accounting makes transparent the asset, liabilities and net worth of line agencies on which chief
executives are evaluated. At the same time, chief executives have been given complete autonomy over the
allocation of resources, including  the right to hire and fire employees.
To sum up, then, technical efficiency in the use of budgeted resources will depend upon the relative
autonomy of  line agencies and the extent to which they can be  held accountable for performance, the
predictability  of resource flows into ministerial budgets, the competence  of line agency bureaucrats, and the
extent to which recruitment  and promotion  is based on merit. In Table 4, we present a capsule summary of the
arrangements and accountability/transparency  mechanisms that can help make government  delivery of public
services more technically  efficient.
Interactions and Tradeoffs Among the Three Levels of Expenditure Outcomes
Above, we  have summarized the institutional arrangements, transparency and  accountability mechanisms
which can help achieve each the three basic objectives  discussed  above.  Table 5 summarizes  this matrix. This
represents a diagnostic framework to analyze  the impact of budgetary institutions on expenditure outcomes in
particular countries.
Table 4. Technical Efficiency
Institutional  arrangements  Accountability  Transparency
A.  Civil  service  pay and  merit-based  recruitment/promotion Clarity  of purpose  and  tasks  Published
B. Managerial  autonomy  of line  agencies  Chief  executive  tenure  Made  public
C. Predictability  in  resource  flow  Financial  accounts,  audits  Freedom  of the press
Client  surveys
Contestability  in service  delivery
10Table 5. Key Institutional  Arrangements  and Expenditure  Outcomes
Institutional  arrangements  Accountability  Transparency
I. Aggregate  fiscal  discipline
A. Macro  framework  and  coordination  mechanisms  Ex-post  reconciliation  Published
B. Dominance  of central  ministries  Sanctions  Made  public
C. Formal  constraints  Openness  of financial  markets  Freedom  of the press
D.  Hard  budget  constraints
E. Comprehensiveness  of budget
II.  PrioTitization
A. Forward  estimates  Reporting  on outcomes  Published
B. Comprehensiveness  of the budget  Ex-post  evaluations  Freedom  of the press
C. Flexibility  of line  agencies  Hard  budget  constraint  Made  public
D. Breadth  of consultations  Technical  capacity  of parliament  Comprehensible
E. Use  of objective  criteria
Ill. Technical  Efficiency
A. Civil  service  pay &  merit-based  recruitment/promotion  Clarity  of purpose/task  Published
B. Managerial  autonomy  of line  agencies  Chief  executive  tenure  Made  public
C. Predictability  of resource  flow  Financial  accounts,  audits  Freedom  of the press
Client  surveys
Contestability  in service  delivery
In this regard, it is critical  to underscore two central points: (i) there are interactions among the three levels
of expenditure outcomes and their institutional  arrangements; and (ii) budgeting systems face tradeoffs among
the levels of expenditure outcomes which they are geared towards. It is this emphasis on interactions and
tradeoffs that  distinguishes our  approach from  other  recent  studies that  have  focused exclusively on
institutional arrangements that contribute to aggregate fiscal discipline (e.g., Alesina and others 1995; von
Hagen 1992).
Regarding interactions, the manner in which aggregate fiscal discipline is achieved may impede strategic
prioritization and technical efficiency. For instance, in several Sub-Saharan African countries, ex-ante fiscal
targets are overambitious reflecting various underlying incentive problems. The result is that during budget
implementation, ad hoc and arbitrary cuts are made in public spending to meet the aggregate deficit and
spending targets. So even though aggregate fiscal discipline may be achieved at the end of the year, budgeted
priorities are undermined and there is a large variance between the actual versus budgeted composition of
spending (e.g., 90 percent average variance in Uganda). Further, ad hoc cuts during the year create uncertainty
about the flow of resources to programs and projects, undermining much-needed predictability for technical
efficiency. Conversely, weaknesses in technical efficiency may undermine prioritization and aggregate fiscal
discipline. Poor delivery of services may impede the actual achievement  of budgeted priorities.  Weaknesses in
financial accounting and auditing may mean that there is no mechanism to track whether actual expenditures
are within aggregate limits (e.g., Ghana).
Related to these interactions, countries face tradeoffs in terms of which levels of expenditure outcomes
their systems should be geared towards. This is because there are transactions  and other costs to setting up the
corresponding systems, and the incentives of key actors gets geared towards the achievement of particular
expenditure outcomes. The comparison between New Zealand and Australia which is discussed in further
detail below illustrates this trade-off well. Both New Zealand and Australia sought to achieve aggregate fiscal
discipline, but while New Zealand introduced incentive mechanisms to achieve this through technically
efficient use of resources, Australia focused on reforms to better prioritize expenditures  to reduce spending and
deficits.
11The Impact of Donor Assistance
Finally, in the analytical  framework,  we consider the impact of donor assistance  on each  of the three problems
above in the form of a "comparative  statics" exercise.  This is critical because donor  assistance  finances  a large
share  of  public  expenditures  in  many  countries,  including  our  three  African  countries.  We  examine  how
incentives  associated  with  donor  assistance  can undermine  or  enhance  the  effectiveness  of  each  of  the key
arrangements  or mechanisms  above.
Donor  assistance  can  exacerbate  the  tragedy of  the commons  because  it is in the  mutual  interest  of  line
agencies  and  "sectoral"  donors  (i.e.,  bilateral  donors  or  sector divisions  in multilateral  agencies  such  as  the
World  Bank)  to  enter  into  bilateral  deals  for  enclaves  of  project  financing.  However,  this  can  result  in
cumulative  demands  for counterpart  funds, or future demands  for recurrent  cost  or debt  service requirements
which  are  inconsistent  with  the  macroeconomic  framework.  At  the  same  time,  conditionality  imposed  by
"central  donors"  (i.e.,  IMF  and  country  operations  divisions  in  the  World  Bank)  can  help  address  the
government's  own  tragedy of the commons  by helping  bind disparate  groups  to aggregate  fiscal discipline  in
order  to  receive  substantial  amounts  of  donor  assistance.  Consequently,  the  tragedy  of  the  commons  on
account  of  donor  assistance  can  be  ameliorated  by  (i)  according  dominance  to  the  "central"  donors  in
evaluating,  monitoring  and  enforcing  limits on aggregate spending  and deficits;  or (ii) improving mechanisms
in country  systems to enforce  aggregate  fiscal discipline  through  mechanisms  outlined  above  (e.g.,  instituting
capacity  to plan  and  enforce  medium-term  macroeconomic  targets,  dominance  of  central  ministries),  with
donors  abiding  by  the  resulting  hard  budget  constraints  set  by  government  itself.  The  effectiveness  of  the
former will depend  upon the internal incentives  for "central"  donors  to holding government  and other donors
to aggregate  targets,  as opposed  to financing adjustment  or sectoral  loans. The effectiveness  of the latter will
depend  upon whether  transparent  and accountable  mechanisms  for aggregate  fiscal discipline  (e.g.,  published
reconciliation  with internal sanctions, openness of financial markets)  can be instituted within client countries.
The  impact  of  donor  project  assistance  on  the  priority  setting  process  will  depend  upon  whether  the
government  would have undertaken  the project in any event (i.e., whether project resources  are fungible). If so,
there  would  no impact  on  the priority  setting process  as  government  would  use  the  resources  to  finance  a
marginal  project  using  its  own  decision-making  mecnanism.  However,  the  sheer  magnitude  of  project
assistance  in  aid-dependent  countries  makes  it  unlikely  that  government  would  have  undertaken  all  these
projects on its own (even if it had the corresponding  resources). For instance,  donor project assistance  finances
about 35 percent  of total expenditures and about 80 percent of capital expenditures  in Africa. To the extent that
at least  some share  of project  assistance  is not fungible,  donor project  assistance  undermines  priority  setting.
Bilateral  deals with line agencies  for individual projects  fragment  the budget.  Uncoordinated  assistance  from
multiple  donors  makes  it  unlikely  that  they  will  be  mutually  consistent.  Further,  donor-driven  priorities
undermine  the  breadth  of  consultations,  and  the  government's  own  articulation  of  strategic  priorities.  The
composition  of expenditures  gets biased towards expenditure  categories that accord with donors'  internal rules
rather  than  country  requirements;  for  instance,  this  has  biased  government  spending  towards  capital
investments  that donors  have traditionally  financed, even though  there are insufficient  resources  to meet their
future recurrent  costs or the recurrent  costs of existing investments.  The implication  of the above is that donor
assistance  in the form  of non-fungible  projects can undermine  the process  of priority  setting,  and  the process
would clearly be enhanced if donors were to collectively  finance a time-slice  of public spending.
However,  this  would  not  necessarily  suit  the  donors,  who  would  want  to  ensure  that  donor  assistance
promotes  the  allocation  of  expenditures  in accordance  with their  own  objectives  (e.g.,  poverty  alleviation).
Nevertheless,  the  fungibility  of  project  resources  implies  that  donors  should  be  focusing  not  on  individual
project  appraisal  but  on  evaluating  the  broad  composition  of  public  spending.  Indeed,  this  recognition,
combined  with the  increase in adjustment  lending which  provides  general  budgetary  support,  led donors  such
as  the  World  Bank  to devote  substantial  resources  to carrying  out Public  Expenditure  Reviews  (PERs).  In
principle,  PERs  can  potentially  improve  the  allocation  of  spending  through  the  application  of  systematic
criteria  such  as  cost-benefit  analysis  and  incidence  analysis  to  evaluate  the  composition  of  spending.  For
instance,  incidence  analysis  based upon household  surveys can potentially broaden  the  consultation  process  to
include  the  poor  who may  not  otherwise  be  effectively represented,  and  support  donors'  poverty  alleviation
objectives.  PERs also provide a mechanism  for improving aid coordination,  and ensuring  that donor  assistance
12is collectively supporting  a consistent expenditure  program.  The results can then be used to leverage  individual
or  collective  donor  assistance  upon  improvements  in  the  overall  composition  of  expenditures,  including
distributional  impact.  However,  the  effectiveness  of  PERs  in  accomplishing  this  will depend  upon  intemal
incentives  within donor  agencies  for carrying out quality analysis  as opposed  to financing  individual  projects.
Further,  given  information  asymmetries  and demand  revelation  problems  that plague  even  the  government's
own  decision  making  process,  it  may  not  be  feasible  for  donor  PERs  to  evaluate  many  aspects  of  the
composition  of  spending.  Consequently,  PERs  may  need  to  focus  more  on  evaluating  and  improving  the
incentive  structure  that governs  the allocation  and  use  of public  spending,  along  the  lines suggested  in this
paper.  If such  an  exercise  reveals  that the  composition  and  incentives  support  the achievement  of  desirable
objectives,  donors  could finance a time-slice of the government's  expenditure  program.
Finally,  donors  have  sought  to  improve  technical  efficiency  by  creating  their  own  enclaves  of  project
accountability,  with top-ups  for civil servants,  and  separate  rules  for reporting,  accounting,  procurement  and
auditing.  While  this enhances  technical  efficiency for an  individual project,  the government's  broader systems
of accountability  for the remaining expenditures,  including the marginal project  that fungible  project assistance
may  be  financing,  are  not  improved.  Worse,  imposing  disparate  systems  of  accountability  for  individual
projects can  undermine  the government's  own system of accountability.  This would,  once again,  suggest  that
the  effectiveness  of  donor  assistance  can  potentially  be  increased  if  it was  concentrated  on  improving  the
government's  broader  systems  and  incentive  structure  for technical  efficiency  rather  enclaves  of  individual
projects.  In this context,  donor  assistance has primarily  concentrated  upon civil service reform,  which  seeks to
reduce  the  numbers  of  civil  servanits and  increase  average  pay.  While  these  measures  are  necessary,  the
framework  above  would  suggest  that  other  mechanisms  which  have  typically  not  been  addressed  are  also
required  (e.g., more autonomy  for line agencies, carrying out and disseminating  client surveys).
Constructing a Measurable Representation of a Public Expenditure Management System
To characterize  a public  expenditure  management  system,  we need  to develop  a parsimonious  representation
of the system  that captures  its principal  features and that indicates how  these features relate  to each other.  To
do  this,  we  construct  an  index  for  each  of  the  institutional  arrangements  and,  where  applicable,  for
corresponding  transparency  and  accountability  mechanisms.  The arrangements,  mechanisms,  and  associated
indices are presented  in detail in Annex C.
For  a  country  specific  public  expenditure  management  system,  we  assign  index  values  to  each  of  the
institutional  arrangements  and  transparency/accountability  mechanisms  in the table.  The values  are based  on
responses  of  an  expert  on  the  country's  budgeting  process  to  a  diagnostic  questionnaire  which  we  have
prepared  as well as an in-depth  analysis provided by the expert. For two mechanisms,  the openness of financial
markets  and  the  freedom  of  the  press,  we  used  objective  indices  developed  elsewhere.  Because  it  is
accountability  and  transparency  which  binds the  governments  to institutional  arrangements,  give  a weight  of
(1/6) to the arrangement,  (1/3) to the transparency  mechanism,  and  (1/2) to the accountability  mechanisms  and
derive  a  weighted  index  for  the  arrangement  cum  mechanisms.  Where  there  are  no  transparency  and/or
accountability  mechanisms,  we normalize  weights  so that  the sum of the  weights  for all applicable  factors  is
one. For example,  if there are no mechanisms  associated  with an arrangement  then  the arrangement  gets a  full
weight  of  I  and its  weighted  index will be equal to its index  value.  Based  on this, we are able to construct  a
parsimonious  representation  of  each  of  the  three  categories  of  the  system  in  the  form  of  a  chart  and  a
corresponding  slack coefficient  roughly  analogous  to the Gini  coefficient  measure  of  income  inequality.  For
example,  chart I  illustrates  the relative  slack of New Zealand's  pre-reform  (circa  1983) system with respect  to
aggregate  fiscal discipline.  There are five institutional arrangements  under this expenditure  category  (see Table
1),  represented  as  A,  B,  C,  D,  and  E  in  the  horizontal  axis.  We  give  equal  weights  to  each  of  these
arrangements  and  assign  a  maximum  height  of  one  (1)  to  each.  The  actual  country  specific  height
corresponding  to each  arrangement  is given  by the weighted  index  associated  with it, e.g., for A this is 0.325
The  unshaded  portion  represents  the slack  of the  system  with respect  to aggregate  fiscal  discipline.  Its area
(which  is  4.18)  as  a  proportion  of  the  total  area  of  the  chart  (which  is  5) gives  the  corresponding  slack
coefficient  -0.837.
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Some arrangements are themselves characterized by sub-arrangements nested in them. For example, as
shown in Annex C, arrangement II.A (under the strategic prioritization category) , i.e. allocations linked to
strategic  outcomes, has  three  sub-arrangements-articulation  of  strategic outcomes,  the  nature  of  the
expenditure planning horizon, and the discussion  of competing priorities.  In such cases, we take the average of
the actual index values assigned to each of the sub-arrangements and use that as the index value for the
arrangement.
There are also accountability and transparency  mechanisms that apply to a whole category. These are the
openness of financial markets, which is an accountability  mechanism, and the relative freedom of the press,
which is a transparency mechanism. Both mechanisms are essentially exogenous to the public expenditure
system. For the case  of openness of financial markets, we  adjust each accountability mechanism under
aggregate  fiscal discipline by taking the average of the mechanism's index value and the index value for
openness. For the case of freedom of the press, we multiply each relevant transparency mechanism by the
index value for freedom  of the press.
In the case of the prioritization and technical efficiency categories, we assign different weights to each of
the  arrangements cum  accountability/transparency  mechanisms based  on  implications of  the  preceding
analysis. For instance, under technical efficif  acy, we give line agency accountability twice the weight of
competency and autonomy. Without accountability,  competency and autonomy can translate into abuse and
misuse of resources. With accountability,  the government and in particular the line agencies will have strong
incentives  to improve the overall level of competency and to try to use their autonomy to meet their objectives
at  least cost. Specifically, under technical efficiency, we  assign weights of  .5, .5, and  I  respectively to
arrangements A, B, and C (see Table 3) and, under prioritization, weights of 1, .8, .6, .4, .2 respectively to
arrangements A through E (see Table 4), given their decreasing order of importance as suggested by  our
analytical framework. In the country specific analyses, we undertake some sensitivity analysis by comparing
our results with the weights with results based on equal weights for each arrangement.
New Zealand  and Australia
New Zealand
Faced with a severe economic crisis and a heavily interventionist  state not dissimilar from former Eastern
European centrally-planned economies, the government of New Zealand undertook a  sequence of radical
institutional  reforms that sought to completely redefine the role and revamp the functioning of government.
The reforms proceeded in four general stages as embodied in the State-owned Enterprise Act (1986), the State
Sector Act (1988), the Public Finance Act (1989), and the Fiscal Responsibility  Act (1993). The SOE Act took
the state out of production activities that the private sector could just as well provide competitively. The Act
14formed the basis of the strategic focus of the reforms that followed. The State Sector Act abolished the
permanent tenure of civil servants  by putting agency heads on five year (rene -/able)  performance contracts and
granting them the authority to hire and fire employees within their jurisdiction. It also introduced the notion of
splitting an agency into two or more focused business units, e.g., one as the funder/purchaser and another as
the provider. The Public Finance Act introduced  two innovations: first, it enhanced the transparency of public
financial statements by  requiring that all  such statements be put on  an accrual accounting basis  and be
published and made available to the general public; and second, it improved accountability by mandating that
any given appropriation  must be linked  to one of seven categories,  the main one being outputs. The first made
individual agency statements comprehensible  to other agencies as well as to the business community. The
second created incentives for each agency to clearly specify the outputs that it planned to provide during the
fiscal year for which it could then be held accountable for. The Fiscal Responsibility Act enhanced the
transparency and accountability of the government for aggregate fiscal discipline through full and frequent
disclosure of aggregate fiscal infornation and benchmarking  actual performance  vis-a-vis published aggregate
fiscal objectives.
In terms of the summary features in Table 5, the big changes occurred in the second and third columns.
Prior to the reforms, most public financial statements and budgetary documents were not available to the
general public for scrutiny and, even if they were made available,  they could not be easily understood even by
accountants and financial experts in the private sector. Consequently, government performance was largely
non-transparent.  The Public Finance  Act changed this dramatically.
Accountability  of line ministries was very weak as well. There were little or no reconciliations  of ex-ante
provisions with ex-post outcomes. Line ministries did not face a hard budget constraint. Control of their
spending was done mostly through control of their inputs by the central ministries. And because of these, it
was not possible to impose sanctions against line ministries. In other words, line ministries had very little
autonomy. Consequently, it was difficult to hold them accountable  for their performance. The State Sector Act
granted considerable autonomy to  line ministries but made them  accountable for  outputs. It  introduced
sanctions against non-performance:  the chief executive of a line ministry could be dismissed after his or her
five year contract expired and his compensation  was based on the delivery of key outputs; employees of the
line ministry could be fired by the chief executive. And, in conjunction  with the Public Finance Act, it made
reconciliations  de facto mandatory.
Discussions of accountability and transparency rarely focus on the central ministries. This was certainly
the case in New Zealand up to the mid eighties. In fact, there was a period in which the Prime Minister held
the finance portfolio as well, a sit-"tion that could have easily led to fiscal mismanagement  (which it did). But
accountability and transparency of the central ministries have become a crowning point of the reforms. The
Fiscal Responsibility  Act has bound the Minister of Finance  to meeting clear cut fiscal objectives, e.g., cutting
the deficit to I percent. These objectives constitute the outputs that (s)he is responsible for and provide the
basis upon which her or his performance  is judged and thus upon which her or his compensation and tenure
depend.  I  0
Accompanying the public sector reforms were measures that liberalized financial markets. As mentioned
earlier, New Zealand was very much like a centrally  planned economy prior to the reforms. Concomitantly,  the
financial sector was highly controlled. Beginning in the mid-eighties, various measures were introduced to
ease up the controls. By the early nineties, financial  markets were very much open to intemational flows. This
is indicated by one measure of financial  openness which indicates the extent to which domestic real interest
rates exceed world real interest rates. The average of the index over 1980 to 1984 was around 0.3; the average
over 1990 to 1994 is 0.7.11 The index ranges from 0 to I in steps of tenths, e.g., 0.1, 0.2, etc., with higher
numbers reflecting relatively greater  openness.
10 We note also that the head of the contract of the head of the central bank is tied to the inflation rate.
11 The higher the index, the less open the coutry's  financial markets. We do not  have data  for New Zealand on our two main indices,
ATPALP and ICAPALP, since these have constructed only for .emerging markets.
15With regards to the institutional  arrangements  (the first column of Table 5), the major clhanges  occurred in
the third (technical efficiency) and  first (aggregate fiscal discipline) category. As already mentioned, the
permanent tenure of agency heads was abolished and, in its place, a five year perfornance contract based on
clearly defined key outputs for agency heads (now referred to as chief executives) was introduced. In turn,
agency heads  were given the  authority to  hire and  fire employees: the  typical civil service personnel
arrangement was turned over on its head. With this also came a great deal of autonomy over agency matters.
Under the first category (aggregate fiscal discipline), the reforms introduced formal constraints on aggregate
spending and the deficit via the Fiscal Responsibility  Act. Comprehensiveness  also improved since the output
based system forced line agencies to include all possible expenditures in their proposed budgets: budgets are
structured  in terms of seven classes  of outputs;  every expenditure  had to fall into one of these classes.
The New Zealand reformns  have not been focused on the second category-strategic  proritization within
the residual, core public sector. Up till recently, there has been no conscious effort to link agency outputs and
thus expenditure allocations to strategic outcomes. Only in the last year has there been  some attempt to
identify broad strategic priorities and to link annual budgetary conciderations  to these (medium to long term)
priorities.
In Table 6, we summarize the changes that the reforms introduced in terms of the categories and sub-
categories listed in Table 5. Items that are shaded indicate the areas where the reforms introduced significant
changes. Those that are not shaded  represent arrangements  or mechanisms that have not been the focus of the
New Zealand reforms.
Characterizing  Pre  and  Post Reform  Systems.  Using  the methodology  discussed  earlier,  we are  able  to
capture the essential institutional  changes that the above reforms introduced. We derive slack coefficients to
both the pre-reform  (circa 1983)  and the post reform (circa 1994)  systems  of New Zealand. Figure la  indicates
the  weighted  indices  for each  arrangement  (i.e. the  height)  and illustrates  the relative  slack of the pre-reform
system  with respect  to the  three  categories.  The corresponding  slack coefficients  are  i-idicated on  the  right
hand  side. Figure lb  does the same for the post reform system.
Table 6. The New Zealand Reforms
Institutional arrangements  Accountability  Transparencv
1.  Aggregate  Fiscal Discipline
.... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~.  ...... ,'.  .'',
C. Formal  constraints  O.w  $ft'hk  33: 
11.  Priontization
A. Forward estimates  Reporting  on outcomes  Xb:P h*6
Ex-post  evaluations  Freedom  of the press
D. Breadth of consultations  Technical  capacity of parliament  Comprehensible
E. Use of objective criteria
111.  Technical  efficiency
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Correlating Systems with Outcomes. From Figures la  and lb, we discem that the relative slack of the
New Zealand system with respect to aggregate  fiscal discipline is substantially  smaller today than it was in the
pre-reform era-a  slack coefficient of 0.06 vs. 0.74. Corresponding to this has been a significant fall in the
deficit to GDP ratio over the period 1984 to 1994 as indicated in Figure 2. The ratio was about negative 9
percent in 1983 but gradually  fell over the decade so that by 1994 it tumed into a small surplus.
Interestingly, the expenditure to GDP ratio fell less drastically from about 38 percent in 1983 to around 35
percent in 1994. This is depicted in Figure 3. However as Figure 4 illustrates, the composition of spending
changed markedly with the share going to the development of industry falling from about 13 percent in 1983
to approximately 3 percent in 1994 while the share of social services rising roughly from 30 percent to 37
percent and the share of health from 7 percent to around 12 percent. Other expenditure ratios remained
relatively constant. The  slack  coefficient of  the  system (and  thus  the  relative  slack) with  respect to
prioritization is correlated with this change. Circa 1983,  the slack was 0.74; today it is 0.48. A look at Figure
la indicates  the possible weak points of the pre-reform system  with respect to prioritization.  The system scores
low on  arrangements A, C, and E which are respectively arrangements that deal with the articulation of
strategic priorities, those that deal with the flexibility of line agencies, and those that pertain to the use of
economic analysis in evaluating expenditures. Figure lb  shows that substantial changes were introduced to
17address C and E. Changes were also introduced to improve  on B (the relative integration of the budget). The
change in A, which refers to the articulation  of strategic outcomes, is consistent with observed changes in the
role of the state which essentially involved a radical redirection of the role of govenmment  from one that
supported state-owned enterprises and intervened heavily in industry through massive regulation to one that
aggressively  encouraged the provision of contestable  goods and services by private industry. The articulation
of strategic outcomes within the core public sector however  remains weak.
In terms of the capacity to achieve technical  efficiency, the post reform system improved significantly on
the pre-reform system; the former has a slack coefficient of 0.07 and the latter 0.67. Unit cost data is not
generally available except for a very limited sample of activities  and only for a limited time period. The New
Zealand Treasury has conducted a pilot study of productivity  improvements  in a small, select set of activities.
The study estimates average unit costs for  select activities within four ministries. But  as  Scott (1996)
comments there were no adjustments  made to inflation and there were a lot of qualifications.  That is, the data
must be interpreted with caution.
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Due to the request of the Treasury that the results be kept confidential  (for the moment), we will label the
concerned activities anonymously and indicate the changes in unit costs over time estimated for each of
them. 12 We emphasize that these results are very preliminary and may change as the Treasury completes its
study.  The results, which are indicated in Table 7. suggest that unit costs are likely to have fallen between
1984  and 1994.  This is consistent with the change in the slack coefficients (note change label from Table 3 to
Table ).
We have also attempted a characterization  of the pre and post reform systems with equal weights on all
arrangements (cum accountability/transparency  mechanisms) in each of the three expenditure categories. The
results are indicated in Figure B.la  and Figure B.lb  in Annex B. As shown there are changes in the slack
coefficients but the direction of the change remains the same and the relative change in magnitudes are not
significant. This suggests that within reasonable weighting parameters, our characterization has relatively
robust ordinal properties, i.e., big changes remain  big and small changes remain small.
Table 7. Percent Change in Unit Costs in New Zealand, Selected Activities
Activities  Period of study  Percent change in average unit costs
A  1989-94  Fall of 10 to 20%
B  1989-92  Rise of 25%
1992-95  Fall of 25 to 30%
C  1990-94  Fall of 10 to 40%
D  1987-94  0%
* Unit cost  levels  dropped  down to approximately  1989  levels.
12 The  Treasury  expects  to release  the study late  this year  at which  point we can  identify the activities  and have  better  data.
19Australia
Australia has instituted a medium-term  expenditure framework,  which focuses the budget process on changes
in strategic priorities within aggregate fiscal parameters. It has introduced measures that grant considerable
flexibility to line agencies and provide them wiJ.'  ncentives to identify savings options themselves.  At the
same time, the reforms have sought to focus attention  on outcomes and introduce  some form of accountability,
although  these are not formalized.
These reforms consist  of six main, interrelated  elements.  First, a comerstone of the Australian reforms has
been a system of Forward Estimates, or three-year forecasts of the minimum cost of existing policies and
programs, which are automatically  rolled into budgetary allocations if there is no change in policy. This has
removed from ministerial  consideration  the bulk of outlays in any budget which do not involve any changes in
policies. Ministers now allocate t  e limited time for budget consideration to policy development rather than
zero basing an entire set of appropi-ations;  indeed, this has freed  up cabinet time as evidenced  by the decline in
cabinet meetings from 370 in 1981  to 180 in 1988-89  to 121  in 1989-90.  The lock-in feature has also provided
line agencies witlh  more certainty about present and future resources, thereby potentially enhancing technical
efficiency. Finally, the requirement to publish a reconciliation  table which shows and explains the deviation
between the forward estimates for the year and actual allocations  in the annual budget, including  their outyear
implications,  has served as a transparent  and accountable  mechanism  to show areas of policy change as well as
the future demands on resources  of these policies.
Second, mechanisms for macroeconomic  planning  reconcile the forward  estimates  with the target deficit to
identify the scope for new spending and savings. Aggregate fiscal discipline in the determination of target
deficits has in turn been induced by public commitments  to aggregate targets (e.g., the Hawke government's
trilogy of commitments  not to increase spending and taxes, and to reduce the deficit) and implicitly enforced
through open financial  markets and media. Third, decision-making  mechanisms were instituted at a political
level through the "Trilaterals" and the Expenditure  Review Committee (ERC) of the Cabinet to decide upon
competing priorities for spending and  savings to achieve the net fiscal targets. Individual portfolios are
required  to submit spending  and savings proposals to stay within their targets, but it is up to the ERC to decide
whether to choose only the savings or spending options, or both. Fourth, a system of portfolio budgeting was
introduced.  This devolves priority setting to individual  portfolios by encouraging and requiring line agencies
to themselves identify savings and spending options within their portfolio to meet their net savings targets.
This capitalizes on the superior information of line agencies by inducing them to identify their least cost-
effective program in order to fund new programs. Fifth, the development  of the running costs system further
devolved authority within departments  or portfolios.  All administrative  and salary expenses, which previously
consisted of 20 or more items, were consolidated  into a single running cost item, and department managers
were given the authority to allocate this expenditure item to various inputs-including  staff numbers and
salaries-as  they saw fit. Additional flexibility was provided by allowing  agencies to bring forward or carry
over running costs between years, up to a limit of 10 percent. A partial quid pro quo for this freedom is the
annual efficiency dividend  of I percent that agencies are expected to achieve  in their running costs every year.
Fitnally, while portfolio budgeting and  the ruining  cost system devolved authority to line agencies,
program  management and  budgeting  was  introduced  to  focus  attention  on1  outcomes.  This  entailed
classification  of portfolio activities  into programs, and introduction  of accountability  mechanisms by requiring
departments to report on the performance of programs within their portfolios. At  the same time, ex-post
evaluation was introduced to assess whether programs  were achieving their intended results. Various reviews,
however, have concluded that program budgeting and  evaluation has had  limited impact on  budgetary
allocations, but has helped create a performance-oriented  culture.
Using the methodology above, we are able to characterize the principal features of these reforms, and
assign slack coefficients to both pre-reform and post-reform systems. As shown in Figures 5a and 5b The
coefficients corroborate our qualitative findings that the greatest emphasis in the Australian  reforms has been
on  improving strategic prioritization (i.e., slack coefficient declined from 80 percent to  12 percent) and
aggregate fiscal discipline (i.e., reduction  in coefficient  from 84 percent to 20 percent). At the same time, there
has been less emphasis on introducing  measures for accountability  to enhance technical  efficiency.
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The reforms have had a dramatic impact on the level and composition of spending. Aggregate budgetary
outlays declined from 29.8 percent of GDP in  1984-85 to 23.7 percent in  1989-90. This involved three
consecutive years of negative real growth in outlays (1987-88 to 1989-90) and four years of resulting budget
surplus (1986-87 to 1990-91).  The budget deficit moved from 4.1 percent of GDP in 1983-84  to a surplus of 2
percent of GDP in 1989-90!
The reduction in forward estimates of outlays from 1987 was even more dramatic than the reduction in
actual expenditures. Figure 6 shows that there was a strong tendency in the early 1980s for forward estimates
of outlays on existing outlays to rise steeply. This meant that the reduction in annual growth of spending
involved a double task: reversal of growth in forward estimates to bring spending down to the preceding year,
and further reductions in spending to achieve net declines. From 1987, however, the forward estimates of
outlays begin to show declines in the outyears, under the influence of budget decisions that reduced outlays
over a period of time.
21What is striking about the Australian experience is that these dramatic cuts were achieved by significant
changes in the composition of intrasectoral expenditures on account of savings identified by line agencies
themselves (Figure 7). The distribution of real savings measures undertaken by line agencies show that the
spending cuts involved some major policy shifts, particularly in the social security function, where a much
higher degree of outlays targeting was achieved.  However, the bulk of the changes in expenditure composition
came from measures of a  highly activity specific nature, involving program redesign and elimination of
particular, less cost-effective aspects of program spending. These achievements contrast sharply with an
attempt to reduce spending by an earlier administration in the early  1980s, which unsuccessfully tried to
eliminate  redundant functions  in a centralized manner and merely  ended up making modest reductions through
across-the-board  cuts.
New Zealand versus Australia: A Comparison
New Zealand and Australia are often mentioned together as being at the cutting edge of institutional  reform.
Our analysis above reveals that while they share some important principles in their reform efforts, they have
by and large taken dramatically  different  paths, which provide quite separate  paradigms for other countries.
Perhaps the most important shared characteristic  of the two reforms is that they each have sought to alter
underlying incentives  which govern the allocation and use of resources. Within this, a common feature is
transparency,  which binds key players to particular fiscal outcomes and makes it costly for them to misbehave.
Transparency  pervades all key aspects of the New Zealand reforms-e.g.,  explicit delineation of outputs the
contracts  of chief executives,  budgetary appropriations  explicitly  based upon outputs purchased, publication of
balance sheets showing net worth of government, and legislatively  mandated full and frequent disclosure. In
Australia, transparency is best exemplified  in the requirement to publish a reconciliation  table for the forward
estimates, explicitly indicating how much particular outlays were changed in the annual budget vis-a-vis the
forward estimates,  the reasons behind these changes,  and their outyear implications.
Figure 6. Budget and Forward Eslimates,  Cumulative  Real Growth, Australia
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Another  shared  feature  is  considerable  devolution  to  line  agencies  to  perform  their  tasks.  In  both
countries, this has created incentives  which make it worthwhile  for line agencies to identify savings, and move
them toward a greater interest in both allocative and technical efficiency. In New Zealand, chief executives
have complete autonomy over th;  allocation of inputs to produce the outputs, including the right to hire and
fire. In Australia, all administrative  expenses  of line agencies  have been consolidated  into a single running cost
item, and managers have complete flexibility in the allocation of these costs across inputs, including staff
numbers  and  salaries.  Further, portfolio budgeting in  Australia devolves priority  setting to  individual
departments,  encouraging them to identify the specific spending and savings measures to meet their net fiscal
targets. Another shared feature is contestability in service delivery. In both countries, there  is a  strong
emphasis on unbundling the provision of public services, and introducing competition in service delivery-
including from the private sector-in  order to achieve technically efficient  outcomes. While New Zealand has
gone much farther down this route, Australia too has instituted  explicit measures for contestability-even  for
policy advice.
A final common  characteristic  has been a binding commitment  to aggregate fiscal  discipline.  Each country
has publicly committed itself to targets for fiscal prudence, and has instituted mechanisms which facilitate  the
achievement  of fiscal targets. At the same time, the openness of financial  markets and the media have provided
an external disciplining  mechanism to ensure  adherence  to prudent fiscal targets.
Past this, however, Australia and New Zealand have adopted dramatically different reforms to achieving
aggregate fiscal  discipline. A  principal distinguishing feature has  been the  relative emphasis placed  on
technical  efficiency  in New  Zealand  as  opposed  to  strategic  priority  setting  in  Australia.  This  is  clearly
revealed in their relative slack measures corresponding  to the two outcomes as shown in Figure 8. This in turn
has reflects relative emphasis on technical efficiency in the delivery of outputs (i.e., goods and services
produced) in New Zealand, as opposed to the cost-effective achievement of outcomes (i.e., the impact of
outputs on beneficiaries) in Australia. The different reforms in the two countries have been path-dependent,
reflecting the particular background  and historical conditions  driving  each reform.
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On the eve of reforms, New  Zealand inherited an overexpanded public sector not dissimilar to the
command  economies  of  the  former  socialist countries. Consequently, a  principal  emphasis  was  on
restructuring  the role of the state by privatizing large chunks of the public sector. This extended itself into the
paradigm of instituting  private sector incentive mechanisms  within the remaining  core public sector in order to
achieve technical efficiency in the delivery of outputs. There is a strong emphasis on formal contracts for
accountability in  the  efficient delivery of  outputs. Management contracts between ministers and  chief
executives,  as well as budgetary  appropriations,  have been based upon outputs.
By contrast,  the Australian  reforms were launched  when a preceding administration  had been unsuccessful
in reducing public spending by  identifying redundant functions. A centralized, top-down Commonwealth
Review of Functions failed to identify egregious anomalies  in the role of the state in Australia. Consequently,
the Australian reforms sought to rely on a more nuanced and finely surgical process of identifying savings.
They did so by  focusing the budget process on changes in strategic priorities, and relying heavily on line
agencies to  themselves identify savings options. The  system seeks  to  achieve results  by  creating  an
environment in which  strategic priorities are articulated at  the political level, and  managers are  given
considerable flexibility-through  portfolio budgeting and the running cost system-to  achieve the intended
outcomes. The  system seeks  to  achieve accountability through reporting on  performance and  ex-post
evaluations,  but there are no formal outcome- or output-based  contracts.
Consequently, in Australia, tightly specified accountability mechanisms based  on outputs as in New
Zealand have been sacrificed in favor of a greater collective as well as individual focus on outcomes. This
reflects a  fundamentally different philosophical emphasis driving the two  reform efforts, with  Australia
placing a greater faith on trust and consensual relationships  and New Zealand instituting formal accountability
mechanisms  to resolve incentive incompatibility  stemming from a principal-agent  paradigm.
The weakness of the New  Zealand system is that with everyone focused on  outputs and  technical
efficiency, the link with outcomes has been overlooked until recently. The broad priorities (so-called SRAs
and KRAs), which deal with outcomes, have only recently been implemented to forge a closer link with
outcomes. The weakness of the Australian system  rests in much looser systems of accountability, necessitated
to some extent by its federal  structure.
It is worth asking whether a country  could not merely adopt the best of the two countries-i.e.,  a focus on
strategic priorities as well as technical efficiency. In a world without transactions costs, one could well
envisage a system where there is a focus on outcomes, which is then translated into corresponding outputs
through formalized contracts. However, our research suggests that in reality, because of transactions costs,
there  are  tradeoffs that  systems  face  at  the  margin between  allocative efficiency  (i.e.,  cost-effective
24achievement of outcomes) versus technical efficiency. The alternative paths taken by New Zealand versus
Australia demonstrate  this tradeoff that other countries must make.
East Asia
Thailand
Unlike Australia and New Zealand, Thailand has not undertaken any major reforn  of its budget system since
the late fifties when a new military government  created four elite central agencies and gave them considerable
control over the budget process. Overall, the Thai budgeting system is highly centralized. It embodies a long
standing set of arrangements, rules, and procedures that together help exert discipline on  aggregate fiscal
management. It grants very little autonomy to line agencies over their budgets. And third, it imposes weak
accountability on line agencies  for their performance.
Aggregate fiscal discipline has been the hallmark of the Thai system. Four central agencies interact to
control the level of spending and thus the deficit: the National Economic and  Social Development Board
(NESDB), the Ministry  of Finance (MOF), the Bank of Thailand (BOT), and the Bureau of the Budget (BOB)
in the Prime Minister's Office. This "gang of four" basically provides the macroeconomic framework from
which they determine the aggregate expenditure  ceiling. They also determine for the most part the ministerial
ceilings. The Cabinet may recommend changes but this has generally not resulted in any changes in the
ceilings, and certainly not in the aggregate ceiling. In Parliament, the Budget Scrutiny Committee, which is
chaired by  the  Minister of Finance, is primarily responsible for  evaluating the  government's proposal.
Committee members can propose to amend the government's proposal. However, the Committee seldom
makes any significant changes to allocations to line agencies. Part of the reason for this is that members of
Parliament have very limited technical staff to assist them in evaluating government proposals.  However,
politicians do intervene to alter some allocations within each of the line agencies. Once deliberations and
negotiations are completed, the Committee presents the budget bill to Parliament. Parliament almost always
accepts the bill.
This institutional set-up is complemented  by formal rules that effectively set legal limits on the budget
deficit.  For example,  in  any  particular year,  public borrowing cannot exceed 20  percent of  the  total
govemment expenditure for that year plus 80 percent of the amount earmarked for the repayment of the
principal for both domestic and external debts. As another example, Parliament is prohibited from amending
the govenmment's  proposed budget ceilings upward.  These constraints however need to be juxtaposed with the
existence of extra-budgetary  funds (Krongkaew 1995) and the exclusion of financial support for at least some
large public enterprises.1 3
The Thai system is weak in terms of encouraging efficient and effective use of resources by  the line
agencies. By international  standards, the system is extraordinarily centralized. Our field interviews revealed
that over 90 percent of total government  expenditures are incurred by the central government. At the central
govemment level, the BOB exerts extensive control over an agency's expenditures, setting ceilings on each of
the seven categories  of expenditures, e.g., wages and salaries, 0  & M, and enforcing stringent rules governing
the release of funds. That is, a line agency is subject to extensive input controls and thus has very little
autonomy. On the flip side, an agency is subject to very lax accountability which is to be expected: if an
agency has little autonomy, it cannot be held accountable for its performance. Although line agencies are
required to submit frequent reports on project implementation,  the BOB does not have the capacity to evaluate
the performance of the project or the accuracy of the information  submitted. There is a National Audit Office
which handles the financial auditing of the line agency programs. But it is terribly undermanned.
Prioritization resides largely in the gang of four. One of its major tasks is to ensure that the budgetary
requests of line agencies and the programs they embody are consistent with the objectives of the five year
development plan. The plan is prepared by  the NESDB in consultation with the Prime Minister and the
different ministries. The NESDB has considerable  influence over the final outlines of the plan. Given the gang
13 There is some question about the relative size of these funds (Krongkaew 1995). There is however no debate about their existence.
25of four's control over aggregate allocations to agencies and to expenditure categories, this implies that the
gang exerts considerable leverage over priority setting. Very little feedback is obtained from Parliament, the
line agencies,  and other claimants.
There are other problems with prioritization as well. Only the capital or investment budget is linked
directly to the development plan. Recurrent expenditures are set separately and on an annual basis, i.e. no
medium term focus. And there are no systematic  reconciliations  of ex-ante budgetary allocations with ex post
expenditure allocations. Moreover there is little evidence that economic analysis is much used to guide the
allocation of expenditures.
A preliminary characterization of Thailand's system is presented in Figure 9a. As shown, the system is
relatively strong on aggregate fiscal  discipline  but weak on both prioritization and technical efficiency.
Indonesia
Indonesia is similar to Thailand in that it places a  heavy emphasis on aggregate fiscal discipline. Unlike
Thailand, there are institutional arrangements in the system which are more explicitly focused on priority
setting. However, measures  to enhance efficiency  and effectiveness  of line agencies  remain weak.
The constitution in Indonesia explicitly specifies that the budget must be  in balance. However, the
definition of budget balance is such that aggregate government expenditures must be  equal to domestic
revenues plus external borrowing. While domestic  borrowing from the public cr the central bank (i.e., printing
money to  finance deficits) is prohibited, there  is nothing in  principle to prevent  the government from
borrowing excessively from abroad except self discipline  and the discipline  of market lenders.  The granting of
authority over macroeconomic policy to the technocratic cadre (the so-called "Berkeley mafia"),  located
primarily in Bappenas (the planning body), the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, has been a key
factor in accounting for restraint on aggregate spending. These policymakers share an ideological coherence
and commitment to macro discipline and are responsible for providing a  macroeconomic framework that
defines the parameters upon which annual aggregates are based. Moreover, they are judged on the basis of
their success in maintaining macroeconomic stability and are subject to implicit sanctions by  the political
leadership. The open capital account that Indonesia instituted decades ago has provided a complementary
disciplining force for these policymakers. Fiscal indiscipline in this context would result in a run on foreign
exchange reserves and a depreciation of the exchange rate. The experience with the Pertamina crisis in 1975
(Pertamina is the parastatal oil company)  has served as a reminder of the negative repercussions of excessive
borrowing. Since then, there have nevertheless been some, smaller bouts of excesses which have necessitated
the imposition of some rules goveming extemal borrowing. A  intergovemmental committee, Commercial
Offshore Loan Team (COLT),  has been set up to approve and contain extemal loans by public sector entities.
There are also guidelines  for private sector borrowing,  which is monitored  by the Central Bank.
The five-year development plan or the Repelita constitutes the principal vehicle for prioritizing a given
aggregate level of spending. Bappenas is responsible for preparing the development plan. It takes the macro
targets in the plan, and selects projects from the budget submissions  of line ministries that are consistent with
these targets. There has been concem, however, that the targets in Repelita are too aggregated to provide
sufficient guidance for sectoral expenditures. Consequently, more detailed annual targets for each ministry
have been developed in recent years which involve consultation  between Bappenas  and line ministries, and are
made explicit in the so-called Sarlita
The "INPRES"  account constitutes another mechanism for  prioritization that  has  been  growing  in
importance in recent years. INPRES, which stands for Presidential Instructions, consists of specific purpose
transfers to state and local govemments. These are generally targeted to activities that have been demonstrably
associated with poverty reduction, such as primary education and public health care. The allocations for
INPRES  programs have been protected during years of fiscal austerity.
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While the above arrangements  help to prioritize development  expenditures,  there does not appear to be an
equivalent set of arrangements to evaluate and prioritize current expenditures.  Further, Indonesia is only now
confronting the difficulties presented by the segmentation of budgeting for capital and current expenditures.
Until recently, Bappenas has had principal responsibility  for budgeting capital expenditures while the Ministry
of Finance  prepares the routine budget which includes  recurrent  expenditures.
Measures to enhance technical efficiency have focused primarily on  financial audits. Three types of
financial audits are carried out. First, each agency has intemal auditors that evaluate the financial accounts of
projects within the  agency.  Second, there  is  an  audit  unit ("BPKP")  within the  Executive Branch of
government that reports directly to government. Finally, there is the office of the auditor-general ("BPK")
which reports directly to Parliament. But the capacity of these institutions  is limited and weak. Like Thailand,
line agencies have very little autonomy and accountability.  But the Indonesian system is worse in that a merit
based recruitment and promotion system is sadly lacking and compensation  of civil servants lags equivalent
compensation  in the private sector much more significantly  (Campos  and Root 1996).
27By  comparison  with  the  Thai  system,  the  Indonesian  system  appears  just  slightly  less  effective  in
restraining  aggregate  spending  but  slightly more effective  in setting  strategic  priorities.14 This  is indicated  in
Figure 9b (in comparison  with Figure 9a) and Figure  10. This characterization  is consistent  with known  facts
about  the  two  countries.  Both  have  on  average  had  small  deficits  (relative  to  GDP)  but  Thailand  has
experienced  greater imbalances  in expenditures  for the social sectors.  In particular,  Thailand's  expenditures  on
secondary education  have been substantially  below  the average  for developing  countries  and more so relative
to other East Asian  countries (Wor.-i Bank  1993).
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Ghana,  Uganda  and Malawi
Using the  analytical  framework  and methodology  above,  we  evaluate  the institutional  arrangements  in three
African  countries.  Below,  we summarize  the  principal  institutional  features  shared  by  these  countries,  and,
using examples from Ghana and Uganda, present some corresponding  expenditure  outcomes.  We also describe
the recent initiatives  being undertaken  by each country to address its institutional problems  and offer  a critique
of these initiatives.  We end this section with suggestions  for possible reform experiments.
Two  key  factors  stand  out which  affect  the three  levels  of  expenditure  outcomes  in each  of  the  sample
African  countries,  albeit  to  varying  degrees.  First  is  the  central  role  of  donor  assistance.  While  donor
assistance  has provided  incentives  for short-term  aggregate  fiscal discipline,  it has  also  impeded  expenditure
prioritization  because of the manner  in which expenditure  cuts have been imposed.  Moreover,  multiple  donor
projects have fragmented the budget. Donor conditionality  on the broader composition  of expenditures  has not
been effective,  nor  have been donor  driven attempts  to improve  technical  efficiency.  A  second feature  is the
lack  of  transparency  and  accountability  in  underlying  and  surrounding  systems,  resulting  in  poor
enforceability  of  existing  rules.  Budgetary  decisions  are  often  made  in  an  ad  hoc  manner  with  minimal
consultations  with broad  groups  in civil society,  and there  are few credible  penalties  for inefficiencies  in the
allocation  and use of budgeted resources.
Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
Donor assistance  and  associated  conditionality  appear to have provided  strong  incentives  for governments  to
adhere  to  short-term  aggregate  fiscal  targets.  In  Ghana,  Fund-Bank  programs  have  been  accompanied  by
conditionality  on  the achievement  of  macroeconomic  targets,  including  the  budget  deficit.  These  have  been
closely  watched  by  the  donor  community,  as  they  signal  whether  the program  is "on  track"  and  therefore
whether  the government  will continue  to receive the volume  of planned  assistance  from Fund-Bank  and other
donor sources.  Other factors have also been important. A key factor has been the continuity and competence  of
14 The same features also hold if equal weights are used for each arrangement cum accountability/transparency mechanism (see annex B,
figures B.2a and B.2b).
28a core technocratic  team in the central ministries. The team has had a shared commitment  to reforms as well as
dominance in  enforcing aggregate fiscal discipline. The impact on  aggregate fiscal  discipline has been
impressive. The fiscal deficit in Ghana improved from an average deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP during the
economic trough of  1982-84 to  an  average surplus of  0.8 percent in  1989-91. However, there  was a
considerable weakening in fiscal discipline in the wake of the  1992 elections, triggered by an 80 percent,
across-the-board  increase in wages for civil servants. This led to a slowdown in donor disbursements, and the
government  took actions to engineer a substantial fiscal tumaround during 1993 and 1994. A key development
to monitor will be whether the program will once again go "off track" in the wake of the 1996 elections.
Uganda had continuing, sporadic problems with aggregate fiscal discipline since initiating reforms in
1987. This resulted in stop-and-go  delays in the disbursements  of Fund-Bank  and other donor assistance until
adjustments  were made to bring the program back on track with the Fund-Bank  targets. This pattern, however,
culminated in a full-blown fiscal crisis in 1991/92,  when the budget deficit  jumped from 4.4 percent of GDP in
the preceding year to 7.7 percent of GDP. However, swift action came not as much from donors as from
President Museveni himself. The then-Minister  of Finance was replaced, and the Ministries of Finance and
Planning were merged. The President gave a speech which is plastered on the walls of many Ministry of
Finance staff: "Inflation is indiscipline.  If there is no money, you must walk or close down ministries." The
political commitment  that this signaled was buttressed  by the computerized,  monthly cash management system
that was developed to impose cash limits and improve coordination  among the central agencies. The result is
that the budget deficit has been more than halved from 7.7 percent of GDP in 1991/92 to reach 2.9 percent of
GDP by 1994/95.
Expenditure  Prioritization
Donors have also sought to influence the composition of expenditures  through direct project assistance, as well
as through conditionality on the broader composition of expenditures, informed by a series of PERs. Direct
project assistance has been substantial, financing about 80 percent of capital expenditures, or 35 percent of
total expenditures in the two countries (Table  - ). This has meant that the bulk of the Public Investment
Program has been determined by donor-driven priorities, thereby fragmenting and undermining the priority
setting process within the countries.
In Ghana, an attempt to further prioritize projects and protect them from expenditure cuts during budget
implementation led to the creation of the "core" program. This proved ineffective because line agencies and
sectoral donors continued to enter into bilateral deals, creating pressures which expanded the "core" program.
The result was that an additional "Supercore" was created. This, too, proved ineffective because underlying
incentives  to add projects persisted. Both the core and Supercore  were abolished in 1990.
A succession of Bank PERs for Ghana continued to flag the problem of unsustainable recurrent cost
requirements, but there was no attempt to understand and  frontally deal with the problem of underlying
incentives between donors and government which led to the problem in the first place. Instead, the Bank
imposed conditionality requiring minimum allocations for operations and maintenance (O&M) expenditures.
However, the norms were applied only to the Ministries of Education, Health and Agriculture-the  ministries
the Bank had most been involved in. While these ministries benefited immensely in terms of enhanced
allocations (World Bank 1992), the overall resource constraint meant even smaller allocations for others. In
the event, the O&M norms have not proven effective  and have been dropped.
Table 8. Africa: Donor Financing of the Budget
Ghana  Uganda
Project  financing  as percent  of capital expenditures  71  87
Project financing as percent of total expenditures  27  43
Total donor financing  as percent of total expenditures  32  67
29In  Uganda, donors  sought  to  improve the  broader composition of  public  spending  by  imposing
conditionality to increase allocations for Priority Program Areas (PPAs). A Bank PER undertaken in 1991
identified key programs or PPAs (e.g., primary education,  primary health care and road maintenance) which
were grossly underfunded, and associated conditionality in adjustment loans sought to increase and protect
allocations  for PPAs. However, as with the core and Supercore  in Ghana, the list of PPAs has since more than
doubled to include several administrative  and judiciary programs. Further, while budgeted allocations for the
PPAs were significantly increased in the initial year, it has proven difficult to  ensure a  flow of  actual
expenditures to these programs. Indeed, even though allocations  to PPAs have been increased in recent years,
the rate of increase was less than the general increase  in the nonwage component  of the recurrent budget and in
many instances, less than the inflation  rate.
In actuality, a key underlying  problem in both countries is that budgeted priorities have been undermined
by  the short-term and ad hoc manner in which expenditure cuts have been made. In Ghana in  1993, the
government undertook to understand the underlying problems itself by assuming responsibility for carrying
out the PERs hitherto undertaken  by the Bank. The two recent PERs undertaken  by the government  document
the problems with budget preparation and execution.  The problem starts with delays in the formulation of the
macroeconomic framework itself. The delay takes place partly due to lags in the availability  of relevant data
and partly due to the late timing of negotiations  with the Fund and Bank on the macro framework.  The result is
that line ministries are asked to submit budget proposals without any credible ceilings, resulting in bids far in
excess of available resources. For instance, in 1995 the Ministry of Highways proposed 510 billion cedis,
while only 110 billion were ultimately allocated. The result is that the central ministries have resorted to
across-the-board cuts on budget submissions to meet fiscal targets, without any link to strategic priorities or
outcomes.
However, whatever expenditure allocations are made in the budget are further undermined as drastic
expenditure cuts are made in an arbitrary and non-transparent  manner during budget implementation.  Part of
the problem-albeit  to varying extents in the three countries-stems  from overoptimism  in the macroeconomic
framework  and its associated resource envelope,  reflecting donors' internal incentives  to show ambitious fiscal
targets in order to get loans approved  as well as the Ministry of Finance's interest in deferring an upfront battle
on expenditure priorities.  A recent OED report, for instance,  shows that revenues and extemal flows in Ghana
had  typically been  overestimated during the  1980s. This  often necessitated draconian expenditure cuts
imposed in an ad hoc manner by the Controller  and Accountant  General during budget implementation  to meet
the deficit targets, which then undermines the approved  budget.
The result of similar  problems in each of the three countries is that actual expenditure allocations  are often
at  large variance with budgeted priorities, undermining the legitimacy of the formal budgetary process. In
Uganda, for instance, large amounts of supplementary  expenditures have been incurred  by powerful ministries
(e.g., over 10 percent of total expenditure  as opposed to a target of 3 percent). The result is that the average
deviation in actual allocation versus budgeted allocation for PPAs has been over 90 percent, with the range
varying between 70 percent for the Ministry of Education and 590 percent for the Ministry of Justice. In
Ghana, the problem is even worse, because information about actual expenditures are simply not available
within any reasonable timeframe.
Technical Efficiency
Finally, poor incentives for civil servants to deliver public services-resulting  from very low salary levels,
poor definition of responsibilities as well as a lack of credible accountability mechanisms-constitutes  the
most serious obstacle to achieving a minimum level of technical efficiency (slack coefficient of 83 percent),
without which efforts at prioritization  or aggregate fiscal discipline will be rendered meaningless. In response
to the  general malaise in  the system, donors have typically created enclaves of better performance and
accountability for their own projects,  with top-ups for project staff and strict rules for procurement, accounting
and auditing.
Broader efforts to improve technical efficiency have focused primarily on civil service reform. In Ghana,
for instance, the Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP) ran from 1987 to 1993 with a principal emphasis on
reducing the number of civil servants and decompressing the pay  structure. Even though this  achieved
30significant retrenchment  as the size of the civil service declined by 48 percent, total public sector employment
declined by  substantially less (24  percent) as retrenched civil servants returned to  the  payroll through
"subvented organizations." Further, the increase in average pay and decompression of the wage structure has
not yielded discernible improvements in productivity. Similarly, in Uganda, the removal of "ghost" workers
and redundant employees has reduced the size of central government employment from 320,000 in 1990 to
around 148,000 in  1994. In addition, there has been significant real increases in salary, although without
discernible improvements  in technical  efficiency.
The initial reform efforts have not attempted to institutionalize measures to accord greater autonomy and
predictability  in resources for line agencies,  and to make line agencies more accountable for their performance
(e.g., through clear delineation  of tasks, client surveys).
Characterizing the Public Expenditure  Management Systems
Using  our  methodology and  indices,  we  developed measures  for  each  of  the  principal  institutional
arrangements in the African sample. To capture the effects of donor assistance,  we carried out a "comparative
statics" exercise to begin with the institutional arrangements in the governments' own systems, and then
examine the impact of donor assistance.  The summary representation is presented in Fgures  1I and 12. This
confirms that the above analysis that while there has been less slack in aggregate fiscal discipline, institutional
mechanisms for expenditure  prioritization and technical efficiency  have been very weak (slack coefficients of
over 90 percent). Furthermnore,  this shows the impact of donor assistance. Donor conditionality  reduces slack
for  aggregate fiscal discipline (from 86 percent to 66  percent). However, the  manner in which  ad hoc
expenditure  cuts  are  made  dur-ni  budget  implementation undermines budgeted priorities  as  well  as
predictability  in the flow of resources for technical efficiency. Further, the multitude of donor-driven projects
in the dual budget structure fragments  the budget and undermines prioritization.  The net result is a weakening
of the overall priority-setting process on account of donor assistance (slack coefficient increases from 92
percent to 97 percent). Enclaves of accountability  for donor projects improves technical efficiency for those
projects,  but undermines government's own systems of accountability.  The net result is no appreciable gain in
technical  efficiency, as measured  by the slack coefficient.
Critique of Recent  Reform Experiments
In response to the above set of problems, each of the three countries is undertaking  a different set of reforms.
Below,  we summarize our critique  of these reforms, including  some suggestions for reforn experiments based
upon the findings of our research.
Ghana. The government of Ghana has assumed responsibility and ownership of the process to review
public expenditures which had  traditionally been  carried out by  the World Bank. These  reviews have
highlighted the lack of a proper accounting system as the principal problem. Consequently, the government
and the donor community are placing central emphasis on improving the financial management information
system. While this will facilitate financial or legal accountability  by ensuring that actual expenditures are in
line with budgeted allocations, other efforts will be required  to ensure that the original budgeted allocations  are
driven by strategic priorities or a  focus on outcomes to begin with, and that there are systems in place to
evaluate whether these have in fact been achieved.
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32In this regard, Ghana has taken some important  strides in preparing integrated Sector Investment  Programs
(SIPs). Through SIPs, donors are financing a time slice of sectoral expenditures in a coordinated manner (e.g.,
in  highways, education, health).  However, these  SIPs  are  not  embedded  in  an  overall  medium-term
expenditure  framework,  where  intersectoral and  intrasectoral priorities  have  been  articulated  by  the
government within  an  explicit  medium-term resource  envelope. To  achieve  such  an  integration  and
consistency with the govemment's expenditure program, a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF),
along the lines of Uganda or Malawi, needs to be put in place. The govenmment  is now taking steps in this
direction.
To  improve technical efficiency and organization performance, Ghana is launching some innovative
reforms which are worth monitoring. These include the replacement of permanent secretaries of ministries
with  Chief  Directors on  fixed-term contracts, the  requirement to  carry  out  client surveys  for  several
departments and  agencies, establishment of a  Public Complaints Unit,  and  dissemination of  minimum
standards for the delivery of certain services.
Uganda. Uganda has moved aggressively  to institute reforms to control aggregate spending and prioritize
recurrent expenditures through a  medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF). As in  Ghana, this  is an
attempt by the govemment to intemalize the expenditure  prioritization process previously undertaken by Bank
PERs. Strategic prioritization of resource allocations in the MTEF has first emphasized expenditures for the
Priority Programme Areas (PPAs), including primary education, primary health care, road maintenance.
However, the MTEF applies only to recurrent expenditures. Development expenditures or the de-facto aid
budget still consists of fragmented donor-driven projects which have yet to be integrated into a coherent
framework and  whose recurrent expenditure implications have  yet to  be  incorporated into the  MTEF.
Nevertheless, the recent merger of the Ministries of Finance and Ministry of Planning has helped foster a
closer link between the recurrent and development budget. But even the recurrent budget allocations in the
MTEF are not yet linked to the achievement  of specific objectives  or results in key sectors. Consequently, the
MTEF in Uganda needs to be strengthened  by putting in place a bottom-up system of forward estimates, as in
Malawi, together with perfomiance measures as well as measures to grant flexibility to line agencies (as in
Australia). The govemrnment  has recently begun reform initiatives to achieve  this.
To improve prioritization and service delivery, Uganda has launched a  far-reaching decentralization
program.  However, it has  not been  able  to  put  in  place the  institutional prerequisites for  successful
decentralization. To improve technical efficiency, the govemment has been taking steps to improve civil
service salaries. To give these measures further bite, it would appear promising to undertake initiatives to
revitalize the institutions responsible for overseeing the proper use of public funds (e.g., reactivation of the
Public Accounts Committee  of Parliament) and undertake public dissemination  of and dialogue on ex-ante and
ex-post expenditure allocations  and tnieir  outcomes.
Malawi. Among the three countries, Malawi is initiating perhaps the most coherent program to institute a
strategic approach for expenditure planning .hrough a  medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF). A
notable achievement is how the government  has taken complete responsibility  and ownership of the process.
While  the  top-down allocation of  resource envelope  among competing ministries has  not  been  done
systematically as in Uganda through the PPAs and needs to be improved upon, there is a more systematic
bottom-up process that is being implemented.  In particular, four pilot ministries (agriculture, health, education
and works/roads) were selected and asked to (i) review and define sectoral objectives  and policies; (ii) identify
the program of activities needed to implement the sectoral policies; (iii) estimate the actual costs of provides
these services;  and (iv) identify the activities that could be scaled back or stopped altogether to fit within their
expenditure ceilings. A  series  of workshops were held  during  1995 through which  the  four ministries
undertook  to identify and cost out the sector programs. Preliminary  indications are that progress in expenditure
prioritization  has been mixed across key ministries (e.g., successful  in Education  but weak in Health), although
the process is in its very early stages and needs to be monitored over a period of time.
As in Uganda, a key shortcoming  of the MTEF process thus far in Malawi is that it is only being carried
out for  recurrent expenditures. Although lead donors  have  been  designated for  particular sectors,  the
development budget is still an amalgamation of individual donor-driven projects which do not sum up to a
33coherent sectoral strategy, and whose recurrent cost implications have not been factored into the MTEF.
Consequently, there is a need to integrate development  expenditures into the MTEF, and attempt coordinated
donor financing of a time-slice of the resulting expenditure program. Finally, ex-post evaluation needs to be
instituted (e.g., Australia, recent reforms in Colombia) to  complement the ex-ante planning in  order to
ascertain whether sectoral allocations  are achieving  their intended  objectives.
Key Elements of a Larger Research Project
For subsequent research, we envision a larger research project consisting of five related activities. The first
will involve a refinement  of the methodology  for characterizing  a public expenditure management  system. The
second will entail focused analytical work on the role of donors in the budgeting process. The third will
involve monitoring five pilot experiments in  Ghana, Uganda, Malawi, Laos and Colombia to  evaluate
quantitatively  the impact of a focused set of institutional  arrangements. A fourth activity will entail using the
refined methodology to undertake a time-series analysis of the impact of reforms to budgetary institutions in
Malaysia,  where considerable  innovations have been ongoing since the late-1980s.  And the last will carry out
two types of cross-country econometric analysis: (i) the relationship between our index of the quality of a
public expenditure management system and growth; and (ii) a  more in-depth analysis of the  impact of
openness of financial markets, freedom of the press and the enforceability of the rule of law on aggregate
fiscal discipline.
Through this pilot project, we have been able to develop a prototype for a methodology to characterize a
public expenditure  management system. The elements of this methodology include the use of a questionnaire
for completion by country expert(s), the construction of indices to represent key institutional arrangements,
and the formulation of a set of composite measures that help identify principal areas of weakness in a system.
In the next research phase, this methodology and its constituent elements need to be refined and tested more
rigorously. For  instance the  effect of  using  different weights across institutional arrangements on  our
composite measures needs to be analyzed using a much larger sample of countries. Our questionnaire can be
completed by World Bank country economists  or project officers with the assistance of local country experts.
Tlhese  results and expenditure outcomes in the corresponding countries can be used to carry out sensitivity
analyses and identify the biting arrangements  or imechanisms  with greater statistical  rigor.
The role of donors is central in  aid-dependent countries. Our study has only begun to  explore the
theoretical issues that underpin donor-related problems. A  focused analytical piece further clarifying the
essence of  these  problems and  associated institutional arrangements that  can potentially address  these
problems will help improve our understanding  of the budget process in aid dependent countries.
This  pilot project has  clarified in  our minds that  the best  way to  evaluate the  impact  of  specific
institutional arrangements is to  monitor controlled experiments over time within a  country. This  entails
identifying well-defined measures of performance (e.g., results from client surveys), carrying out baseline
measurements and tracking changes over time. Since most experiments thus far have been undertaken in
developed countries, reform experiments  need to be set up in developing countries to help us better understand
the impact of certain arrangements. To this end, the larger research project could monitor experiments in
Uganda, Malawi, Ghana, Laos and Colombia. In Uganda and Malawi, this will involve working with the
country departments and client govermments  to help institutionalize specific features to make the budget more
transparent and  comprehensive. These features will include publishing both expenditures and  outcomes
associated with the  medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) introduced last year, and  undertaking
integrated  budgeting of donor assistance and capital-recurrent  spending  within the MTEF. In Laos, the reform
experiment could include measures to unify the budget, integrating donor assistance and capital-recurrent
expenditures. Ghana could provide a suitable control experiment, because it primarily seeks to improve the
financial information system without instituting an MTEF. In Colombia, the ex-post evaluation system being
put in place could be monitored. In each case, the impact of the innovations could be tracked by examining
changes in  the composition of  expenditures as well  as  through assessments of key  stakeholders (e.g.,
parliamentarians, NGOs, business groups, consumer groups, labor, central and line agency officials) using
surveys.
34Using  the refined methodology as identified above, a  time-series analysis of  reforms to  budgetary
institutions can be carried out in Malaysia. Since the late 1980s, Malaysia has been carrying out a series of
reforms designed to improve strategic prioritization. These include the establishment of a budget dialogue
group with business, labor and other stakeholders  from civil society, greater devolution of decision making to
line agencies and associated accountability  mechanisms similar  to those implemented in New Zealand and the
United Kingdom.
A more extensive and in-depth analysis of the role of financial markets, the press, and the rule of law
should be undertaken. Our initial foray into this set of issues provides some confidence that further exploration
is likely to yield useful policy levers (see Annex A). Confirming  that more open financial  markets helps instill
aggregate discipline independent  of the relative freedom of the press or the enforceability of the rule of law
will give reformers one policy lever to improve  the effectiveness  of a public expenditure  management  system.
Finally, the composite measure we have constructed can be used in a large cross country econometric
analysis to assess the relative contribution of the quality of a public expenditure management system to
economic growth. This will involve circulating the revised diagnostic questionnaire to country experts in a
range of countries and using their responses to derive country specific composite measures. These measures
can then be correlated with the residuals from a standard growth regression.
Concluding Remarks
In this  paper, we  have  developed a  methodology for  evaluating the  quality of  a  public  expenditure
management system. Using theories developed within the field of the new institutional economics and the
experiences of seven countries-Australia, Ghana, Indonesia,  Malawi, New Zealand, Thailand, and Uganda-
with public expenditure  management,  we have been able to identify key institutional  arrangements that affect
aggregate fiscal discipline, strategic prioritization,  and technical efficiency in the use of budgeted resources.
We argue that these arrangements can be effective  only if there are mechanisms that bind public officials to
these arrangements.  By this we mean that public officials will incur a sufficiently high cost if they violate the
arrangements. Within the limitations of our data, we have been able to show that certain mechanisms that
enhance transparency and accountability can indeed introduce  such costs and thus lead to better expenditure
outcomes.
The elements of our proposed methodology  include the use of a questionnaire for completion  by country
experts, the construction of indices to represent key institutional  arrangements,  and the formulation of a set of
composite measures that help identify principal areas of weakness in a system. This methodology and its
constituent elements, however, need to be refined and tested more rigorously.  For instance, the effect of using
different weights across institutional arrangements  on our composite measures needs to be analyzed using a
larger sample of countries. Also the impact of different arrangements on expenditure outcomes needs to be
evaluated more rigorously. Both require more extensive research. One difficulty that arises in this context is
the difficulty of (a) obtaining  data on unit costs, so that some evaluation of technical efficiency can be made,
and (b) developing a metric for evaluating the effectiveness  of the strategic prioritization  process.
The paper does not address a particularly  significant issue: under what conditions could better institutional
arrangements and accountability-transparency  mechanisms be transferred to other settings? It is one thing to
show that a  medium term expenditure framework (MTEF) has worked well in Australia and  another to
evaluate how well this might work in a developing  country. As Levy and Spiller (1994) have shown within the
context of of the design of regulatory systems, the latter problem is very complex and requires in-depth
comparative analysis across countries of more fundamental  underpinnings,  e.g., the relative independence of
the judiciary, and their mapping onto specific institutional  arrangements, e.g., regulation via an agency or via
contract.
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Aggregate Fiscal Discipline and the Role of Financial Markets
Some Preliminary Evidence from Developing Countries
"It's the deficit, stupid!" Such was the headline of an article in a recent Australian  news magazine, the Bulletin
(Walsh, 1995). The Australian electorate,  it seems, has become more aware of the unsavory effects of a large,
lingering current account deficit. A poll of voters conducted by the Bulletin reveals that 65 percent of voters
are  aware of the record high A  $2.5B current account deficit and  79 percent of  those who  are aware
understand what it means. Moreover, the poll shows that 57 percent of voters consider the size of the current
account deficit as the most important  issue that may influence  their vote in the next election, higher even than
interest rates on loans (50%) and the level of personal taxation (49%) and closely following the level of
unemployment  (61%). Not surprisingly  the Bulletin concludes  that "what Labor [the  party in  power] should be
recognizing is that the high current account deficit problem is . . . a lightning  rod for voters' worst fears about
their job security and their home loan repayments."'l Indeed, the current account deficit has become an
important  performance  criteria  upon which govermment  is judged by the general population.
This anecdote has certain implications for the study of budget deficits and their determinants. It suggests
that a government's incentive to control the budget deficit, which under certain circumstances is the mirror
image  of  the current account deficit, can very  well be  influenced by  the  population's awareness and
understanding of the impact of deficits on their personal lives (and therefore their willingness to continue to
support the government). 2 In Australia, the Labor government  effectively tied its own hands (as well as future
governments') by liberalizing financial  markets  and educating  the public on the evils of the twin deficits. Since
financial liberalization began in the early 80's,  developments  in financial markets have become very highly
played up in the press (relative  even to countries like the United States). 3 This has emerged in part because of
the aggressive campaign of the Labor government beginning around 1983 to make the public aware of the
implications of a burgeoning budget deficit on their standard of living (GAO, 1994). Consequently,  the general
public and especially the business community  has become much more aware of the link between government
performance  (as measured in terms of the twin deficits),  the exchange  rate, the inflation rate, and interest rates.
The latter are particularly significant because they directly affect the standard of living of a majority of
households;  the former of course affects businesses adversely  particularly  if the change is sudden and swift.
The Australian experience  may offer some lessons for the control of fiscal deficits. It could very well be
the  case  that, through  liberalization of  financial markets, a  government can be  held  accountable  for
macroeconomic mismanagement.  With open financial  markets, individuals and firms can take their funds in
and out of the country swiftly. A burgeoning  deficit could trigger fears of a devaluation and a rise in inflation
leading to an outflow of foreign exchange and the subsequent realization of these fears, i.e. self-fulfillment.
This would confront the government with a minor, if not a major, economic crisis which could conceivably
contribute to its downfall through the polls or otherwise. In fact, it is conceivable  that investors are extremely
forward looking so that they foresee a burgeoning deficit as leading ultimately  to the fall the government and
thus to some political instability to  which they respond by transferring their funds to  safer, more stable
I Walsh (1995, p.22).
2  Withdrawal of support  could mean rejectiig  the govemment at the polls or, more subtly withdrawal  from the formal  sector of the
economy (Brunetti and Weder 1994).
3 This account is based on extensive interviews with high ranking govemment officials in The Treasury, the Ministry of Finance, and the
Prime  Minister's Office in the Cabinet.
36environments. In these ways, open financial  markets can potentially impose some discipline on a government's
control over the deficit. 4
In many countries, the press is highly suppressed. But where it is not, the Australian experience also
suggests that it too can contribute  to enforcing aggregate fiscal discipline.  Because it helps educate the general
public and because it helps transmit information on government performance more quickly and widely, it
could potentially magnify the response  and impact of financial  markets.
This Annex attempts to explore these conjectures. Specifically, it undertakes preliminary tests of two
hypotheses based on a sample of developing  countries: first, the more open the financial  markets in a country,
the smaller will be the country's  fiscal deficit; second, the freer the press, the greater the impact of open
financial markets on the fiscal deficit. Preliminary is the operative  word. Because of data constraints and the
lack of a  structural model of budget deficits, 5 its findings should be interpreted as evidence that further
exploration of these issues may be warranted.
This Annex is divided into four sections. Part one discusses the potential role of financial markets in
instilling fiscal discipline.  Part two presents various hypotheses  about possible determinants  of budget deficits.
Part three outlines the empirical model and describes the data that is used to test the model. And part four
presents the empirical  results. The paper concludes with possible directions for future research.
Why Open Financial  Markets Matter
To understand why openness of financial  markets influence the government's incentives  to control the budget
deficit, it is instructive to compare the case when financial  markets are open-meaning  funds can be brought
in and out with no restrictions  and markets are allowed to clear-and  the case when they are closed-there  are
stringent controls on the movement of funds in and out of the country grounded on a fixed nominal exchange
rate. Let us start with the latter case. Suppose  the government  decides to run an inordinately large deficit and
to finance it by monetizing it, i.e., create money to finance it. This would lead to inflation and would create
pressure  on  the  current account potentially giving rise  to  a  current account deficit. Alternatively, the
government could choose to sell bonds to the general public. This would lead to an increased demand for
loanable funds and thus would raise the interest rates. In a rational  expectations  world, individuals will foresee
that the government will not be able to meet its obligations in the future and so will refuse to purchase the
bonds. Further, recognizing that the government will not be able to sell the bonds, they can predict that
inflation will occur. Thus they will attempt to purchase foreign exchange  in the black market. In any of these
scenarios,  a contraction  of funds occurs, either of loanable funds or foreign exchange.
Now suppose instead financial markets were open. By running a large deficit, the government triggers
fears among investors that inflation and thus a devaluation will occur. This induces them to move their funds
to other countries where real returns will be higher. But then this creates pressure on the current account and
thus makes the devaluation come true. And with the devaluation comes inflationary pressure. To control
inflation, the government contracts the money supply which leads to a rise in interest rates. Higher interest
rates attract funds back into the country which would tend to push interest rates back down. But, given
investors would now "rank" the government lower in terms of macroeconomic management, the resulting
equilibrium rate would have to be higher, i.e. a premium is required.
In either case, the government suffers a political cost. Higher interest rates and/ or inflation makes the
general public question the effectiveness of the government  and thus its right to continue to govem. But, under
openness, inflation and the rise in interest rates are likely to be lower, given the flexibility of markets, so the
political costs are also likely to be lower. This would seem to suggest that closed financial markets would
impose more of a discipline on the government's spending.  But the experiences  of many developing countries
(especially those in Latin America) when their financial markets where closed reveals quite the opposite-
continuously  high inflation and high interest rates. What explains  this puzzle?
4 This is roughly akin to the  effect a well functioning  stock  mnarket  can have  on corporate  govemance.
5 We are  not aware  of any structural  mLdel  of budget  deficits. The empirical work that we have  come  across  all adopt a "hodge-podge"
approach  to evaluating  the determinants  of budget  deficits based  on reasonable  conjectures.
37To understand this dilemma, one needs to look at the underlying political economy of the two financial
market regimes. In the closed regime, the government  actually enjoys some political benefits from running a
deficit. Because a deficit creates a scarcity of funds and because the government controls these funds, the
government actually creates opportunities for itself to allocate funds in ways that are politically beneficial.
There is extensive evidence of governments  in developing countries using their control over scarce funds to
perpetrate themselves in power by allocating these funds in politically strategic ways (see Bates 1981, for
Africa; Amsden 1989, for Korea; and Wade 1990, for Taiwan). In the open regime, the government loses
much of its control over loanable funds and foreign exchange. Consequently,  it loses much of the benefit from
running a deficit and thus would be less inclined to run one or, if it does, to run smaller ones.
With closed financial markets, the government  actually has access to two instruments which it can use to
build and maintain political support. The artificial scarcity of loanable funds and foreign exchange which is
induced by controls over financial markets gives the government the capacity to allocate the funds to reward
supporters, i.e. running deficits creates scarcity rents that have high political value. So while deficits might
raise inflation and interest rates, the g  3vE  .- nment can allocate funds in ways that compensate key groups for the
resultant erosion in their standard of living. Thus the government  can actually defend itself from deposition. In
contrast, when financial markets are open, the government can no longer exercise effective control over the
allocation of foreign exchange  and loanable funds. So, it actually loses the capacity to compensate supporters
for a fall in their standard of living. The implication of this is that if, under closed financial markets, the
politically tenable rate of inflation and interest rates are x and y respectively, then under open markets the
corresponding  rates would have to be less than x and y. That is, while the government  might still decide to run
deficits when financial markets are open, its calculus  of political benefits and costs would constrain the deficit
to levels below what they would  have been if financial  markets were closed.
A simple graphical illustration will clarify the argument. Assume that the political costs of running a
deficit are increasing and strictly convex (in the deficit) and the political benefits strictly concave. Let C in
FigureA-1 represent the political costs and B the political benefits under a closed regime. The optimal deficit
for the regime would thus be d*. Now, given the costs are lower under the open regime, the corresponding  cost
curve must be lower than C. Let this be C'.  Moreover, since the government has very little control over
loanable funds or foreign exchange  under an open regime, the political benefit curve must drop considerably,
say to B' (in fact, in the extreme case, it disappears).  Consequently,  the optimal deficit falls to d**. That is, the
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38"Ad Hoc" Determinants  of Fiscal Deficits?
Interest in the determinants of fiscal deficits has increased substantially in the last ten years. Continuing
difficulties that governments  in both developed and developing countries have had reducing deficits and the
impact that deficits have had on  their economies have raised pressing questions about the relevance of
normative  economic theories of fiscal policy-what  should governments  do-and  have stimulated a search for
a positive theory-why  do governments do what they do. In particular, the equilibrium approach to fiscal
policy, which has given rise to the so-called "tax smoothing" hypothesis (Barro 1979), has come under heavy
criticism. The approach presumes  that the goverm  ient desires  to minimize  the deadweight  losses from taxation
subject to a dynamic budget constraint. The equilibrium  to this constrained  minimization  problem requires that
explicit tax rates (taxes as a percentage of GDP) be constant over time. 6 Its implication is that (a) budget
deficits occur only during times of unusual spending, e.g., wars and (b) the rate of taxation for different types
of taxes must be highly correlated  (since at the margin, all tax rates must yield the same deadweight  loss). 7
Roubini  and Sachs (1989) have shown  that neither  implication  of the equilibrium approach is supported by
evidence from the OECD countries post 1973.8 If at all budget deficits have persisted since the  1973 oil
crisis.9 Moreover, the seignorage  tax as measured by the inflation rate does not appear to bear any significant
relation with explicit tax rates. 10 Performing similar  types of tests for a large sample of developing countries,
Roubini (1991) provides empirical  evidence that the equilibrium approach also fails to explain the pattern of
fiscal deficits within countries over time.
The failure of the equilibrium approach to adequately explain the observed pattem of budget deficits has
motivated  others to look at the potential  role of political factors.  The underlying  presumption is that if one is to
understand why  governments behave the way they do  then one necessarily has to delve  into politics."I
Following up on his critic of the equilibrium approach, Roubini (1991) provides econometric evidence that
frequent changes in political regimes produce larger budget deficits in developing countries. Roubini and
Sachs (1989) show that, within the OECD, both the number of parties in the ruling coalition and the tenure of
the coalition influence the size of budget deficits-the  larger the number of parties and the shorter the tenure,
the larger the deficit. Alesina and Tabellini (1990) demonstrate  that deficits are likely to be higher, the lower
the probability of a government  being reelected and the greater the polarization between the government  and
the opposition. In a related context, Alesina and Drazen (1989) construct a "war of attrition" model in which
macroeconomic stabilization  is delayed until one group eventually succumbs and "agrees" to shoulder the full
burden. The implication of all these is that political instability affects budget deficits in systematic ways. The
more politically  unstable a country, the higher budget deficits will tend to be.
While politics matters, institutions are also important. Shepsle (1979) has demonstrated that institutional
arrangements help overcome the chaos inherent in social decision making (see Arrow 1963). In particular, he
shows that the nature of the arrangements that underpin the decision making process in a legislature, e.g., the
committee system, affect equilibrium outcomes. Considerable empirical work over the last fifteen years has
provided solid support for this thesis. 12 Given the public sector budget is a,  if not the, major focus of
discussions and debates within government, this would imply that institutional  arrangements  that surround the
budget process are likely to have some influence on budgetary outcomes. Von Hagen (1992) has constructed
6  Some  versions  of the model  show  require  that explicit tax rates  behave  like a  random  walk with mean  zero.
7 See  Mankiw (1987).
8  Roubini and Sachs  (1989) confirm that budget  deficits in the OECD countries  did exhibit decline after the Second  World War up to
1973,  which is consistent  with the equilibrium approach.
9  They  also  show that explicit tax  rates  have  been  increasing  over  time in parallel  to aggregate  spending  (as a  percent  of GDP).
10  The seigniorage  tax is an implicit tax that individuals  and firms pay due to inflation.
I  This insight of course  is not new. It dates  back to Adam Smith and Karl Marx and is the bedrock  of the so-called  new political
economy  which has  been  evolving for the last  twenty years  or so. For  overviews,  see  for example,  Colander  (1984), Enelow  and Hinich (1984),
Staniland (1985), and Rowley, Tollison, and Tullock (1988). And on the issue  of macroeconomic  stabilization, see Haggard  and Kaufnun
(1992) and Williamson (1994).
12  For an  econometric  analysis,  see  Inman and Fitz (1990) and for case  studies,  see  Krehbeil (1991).
39an  index  representing  the  various  types  of  budgetary  institutions  in  countries  comprising  the  European
Community  and  has  used  it to  evaluate  the  impact  of  institutional  arrangements  on budget  deficits  in these
countries.  Alesina  and  others  (1995) have  undertaken  a similar task for Latin  American  countries.  Bohn  and
Inman (1995) have investigated  the potential  impact of constitutional  rules  on the ability of states in the United
States  to run  budget  deficits.  In  each  case, institutional  arrangements  are  shown  to systematically  influence
budget  deficits.  For example,  the  existence  of  constitutional  constraints  to the  deficit  or the  public  debt  are
shown to help reduce deficits.
The effect of budgetary  institutions  is predicated  on the  applicability  of the rule of  law. Indeed  imluch of
the  work  on  institutional  arrangements  and  the  budgetary  process  has  focused  on  the  industrialized
democracies,  and in particular  on the United  States, where  general  adherence  to the rule of law  can be  and is
presumed.  In  fact,  most  models  (both  empirical  and  theoretical)  that  underpin  this  work  assume  that  the
citizenry  desire  the benefits  of  better  budgeting  and  so  are  willing  to obey  the  rules  that  are  necessarv  to
generate  these benefits.  But  in most  developing  countries,  the rule  of law  is less  likely  to have  widespread
adherence  and is relatively more binding in some and less so in others. Hence,  in many of these countries,  the
institutional  arrangements  that  ostensibly  govem  the budget  process  may  not have  as  much  of  an  effect  on
aggregate  fiscal management  and in some may not even matter.
Given  weak adherence  to the rule of law, can some degree of aggregate  fiscal discipline  still be  instilled?
As discussed  earlier the liberalization  of financial markets  is one possible  factor. With open financial  markets,
investors  can respond to fiscal mismanagement  by pulling their funds out and taking them elsewhere.  With the
outflow  of  finds,  foreign  exchange  becomes  more  expensive  which  would  lead  to  a  devaluation.  A
devaluation  would  make  imports  more  expensive  and  thus  could  fuel inflation.  This  in tum  could  lead  to
higher  interest  rates.  To  the extent  that  exports  become  cheaper  and  some  foreign  funds  flow  back  to take
advantage  of the higher interest  rates, the  initial rise  in rates may be  dampened  but in the new equilibrium  it
would still have to be  higher.'3 Higher inflation  and higher interest  rates would  induce the general  public to
blame  the  government  for an  erosion  of  their  standard  of  living  which  would  make  the  government  more
disciplined  in its  spending  and  thus  in controlling  the  deficit.  The implication  of  this  is that  countries  with
more  open  financial  markets  will likely  run  smaller  deficits  and  that  a  country  that  liberalizes  its  financial
markets is likely to have smaller deficits post liberalization.
In the context  of open  financial markets, the role of the press may also be important.  If the press is free to
publish  reports  on the perfonmance  of the  government  and  the  economy  then financial  markets  are  likely  to
have  a greater  impact.  A free press makes the  budget  process  more transparent  because  it can help  uncover
anomalies  and  questionable  activities  related  to govemment  spending.  It can  also  help  educate  the  general
public on  the links  between  the deficit and  the standard  of living, By transmitting  these types  of information
more  widely  and  more  quickly,  the  press  can  hasten  the  response  of  financial  markets  and  heighten  the
reaction  of the  general  public  to fiscal indiscipline.  This would  increase the  cost to the govenmment of fiscal
indiscipline. 1  4
An Ad Hoc Empirical Model
Following  other empirical  work on the  determinants  of budget  deficits,  we construct  an  ad  hoc  econometric
model  to  test  our  two  hypotheses.  Again,  we emphasize  that  the  model  is not  derived  from  any  structural
theoretical  model  of budget  deficits  but,  like other empirical  models,  consists of  a hodge-podge  of  variables
that one might reasonably  expect  to influence  budget deficits. The model  is as follows:
(1)  b  =c+a  POL  +a  CON.  +a  FIN  [FIN,,xFP.,]  G t  5N  i/ it  0  it  ,  '  it  2Fit. +  a3[FN.xR  + 4G.  + 5IN  it
where,
13 Given investors and fund managers see increased deficit spending as a sign of fiscal mismanagement, they will require a risk premium
to put or return funds into the country's financial markets. This means that in equilibrium, the new interest rate would have to be higher than the
world interest rate.
14 In terms of figure 1,  this raises the cost curve C'.
40b is the ratio of the budget surplus to GDP (a negative value would signify a deficit), POL a dummy variable
representing  political instability, CON an index of adherence to the rule of law, FIN a measure of the openness
offinancial markets, FP a measure offreedom of the press, and G the per capita GDP growth rate, and INT a
measure of the sustainability  of the deficit. The subscript i refers to country i and the subscript t to year t.
The political instability variable POL is based on the Barro index (1991) which measures the frequency of
coups and/or assassinations in a country. It takes a value of 1 if there was an assassination or a coup and 0
otherwise. We expect this to be negatively  correlated with the surplus.
To reflect the degree of adherence to the rule of law, an index CON for the enforceability of contracts
among private parties is used. 15 This index is based on responses of businessmen to a survey questionnaire.
The surveys have been done annually since 1982. It takes integer values from 0 to 4 with higher values
representing  better enforceability.  Thus the higher CON the larger the surplus (to GDP).
Budgetary rules may also impact aggregate fiscal discipline. Unfortunately,  we do not yet have an index
that can be used to run statistical  tests. Alesina and others (1995) have developed an index for Latin American
countries and Von Hagen (1992) for the OECD countries. The indices are not exactly comparable because
they are based on different sets of questions. The availability of data for the other variables, in particular the
financial openness indices, precluded us from using either index. Thus we had to omit budgetary rules as a
variable. We note however that, if private contracts  cannot be enforced, it is highly likely that the rule of law is
weak. And if the rule of law is weak then budgetary  rules are unlikely to have significant impact on the fiscal
deficit.
We use three different indices for the (relative) openness of financial markets (FIN). The first and second
indices are taken from Levine and Zervos (1995). The first, APTALP, is based on the intemational arbitrage
pricing model and the second, ICAPALP, on the intemational capital asset pricing model. Both indices are
measures of the integration of a  country's financial markets with global markets. The third index is the
(absolute value) of the uncovered interest parity, UIP, defined as (r - R* - log e) where r  is the domestic
interest rate, R* the London interbank offer rate on one month U.S. dollar denominated  deposits, and log e an
exchange rate adjustment factor. In each of the three cases, smaller index values reflect  greater integration  and
thus openness offinancial markets.
To represent the (relative) freedom of the press, we use Gastil's index of freedom (1983). Higher index
values are associated with less freedom. The index is only roughly reflective of press freedom as it is a
composite index of political freedom and civil liberties.  We presume that there is a sufficiently  high correlation
between this index and press freedom.
Finally we introduce some control variables. To account for the possible role of business cycles, we
introduce the growth rate in per capita GDP (G). The presumption is that the faster the economy grows, the
more revenue the government can raise and/or the less income transfers it needs to make. Thus deficits are
likely to be lower when the economy is growing  rapidly. It would have been better to use unemployment rates
since they reflect more directly the impact of recessions but lack of data for developing countries ruled this
out. We also include the variable INT defined as (PD/GDP)x(R* - G) where PD is the nominal level of the
public debt and R* is as defined above. This variable is meant to capture the sustainability  aspect of deficits.
Governments are presumed to respond to a higher debt burden by cutting down on the deficit in recognition of
the fact that they may not be able to make payments in the future.
Empirical  Results
Given the data constraints, the results of our empirical analysis can only be viewed as indicative. The sample
size is small and the observations  are based on a small number of disparate countries. In some cases we had
only one observation for a country and in other cases as many as eight (years). Moreover, there are missing
variables for which data is not currently available.
15 Data for this  comes  from  Keefer and Knack  (1995).
41As a  first cut, we compare the average ratio of the budget deficit to GDP  in twenty one  countries,
including eight developed countries, before and after the introduction of financial liberalization measures.
Levine and Zervos (1995) have identified the dates at which liberalization  policies were introduced in each of
these countries. For each of these countries, we calculated the average ratio both before and after these "cut-
off" dates. The results are indicated in Table A-1. Fourteen of the twenty one countries (67%) show a
reduction in the mean deficit (as % of GDP) following liberalization.  Among the developing countries, ten out
of the thirteen (77%) and, among the developed  countries, four out of the eight (50%) had a lower mean deficit
post liberalization.  In fact, three countries-Thailand,  Finland, and Sweden-moved  from deficit to surplus.
Table A-1.  Test of Differences  in Deficit before and after  Capital Control Liberalization  Policies
Mean deficit (% of GDP)
Country  t-statistics  Before  After
Developed countries
Australia  1.21  -1.97  -0.96
Austria  -3.60  -2.52  -4.77
France  -0.50  -1.47  -2.17
Italy  -1.67  -10.01  -11.93
Netherlands  -0.085  -3.63  -3.74
Norway  0.35  -1.182  -0.29
Finland  0.42  -0.54  0.14
Sweden  2.78  -3.82  3.72
Developing countries
Indonesia  0.92  -2.06  -1.25
Thailand  6.16  -3.69  2.98
Chile  0.242  -1.35  -0.23
Colombia  -0.09  -1.73  -1.89
India  -0.59  -5.71  -6.96
Jordan  0.07  -7.16  -6.98
South  Korea  1.43  -1.63  -0.84
Malaysia  1.62  -7.75  -1.55
Mexico  0.34  -6.81  -5.36
Pakistan  0.38  -7.15  -6.73
Philippines  -1.03  -1.84  -2.65
Portugal  0.55  -8.18  -6.41
Turkey  -0.17  -3.76  -4.16
Next, we run several regressions  based on (1) above. The results of each of these regressions are indicated
in Table A-2. Columns (1) and (3) present the results of regressions corresponding respectively to the two
altemative measures of openness-APTALP,  and ICAPALP. In each case, the index for financial openness
has the correct sign (higher values are associated with larger deficits or equivalently with smaller surpluses)
and the t-tests are statistically significant.  Columns (2) and (4) add in the freedom of the press index interacted
correspondingly  with each of the financial  openness indices. The coefficient of each of the interaction terms is
positive and the tests significant. The positive sign seems to suggest that a freer press (lower index values)
dampens rather than amplifies the influence of open financial  markets. However taking the partial derivative of
(1) with respect FIN which gives,
(2)  Ob l a  FIN=  a2 + a3FP,
42indicates that a freer press does magnify the marginal impact of financial  openness. In both regressions, a, is
negative and is greater in absolute value than a3FP. 16 Moreover, the greater the freedom (and thus the lower
FP), the lower the value of a3FP and thus the more negative (db I  FIN) .
Table A-2. Dependent  Variable: Deficits as Percent of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  -6.082  -5.007  -7.714  -7.963
(-1.65)  (  (  (-2.17)**
G  -0.083  -0.149  -0.065  -0.079
(-0.706)  (-138)***  (-0.54)  (-0.66)
INT  -0.008  -0.009  -0.008  -0.009
(-3.59)*  (-4.23)*  (-3.77)*  (-3.82)*
CON  2.243  1.776  2.61  2.596
(1.51)**  (1.32)***  (1.72)**  (1.72)**
POL  0.286  0.608  0.943  1.192
(0.32)  (0.73)  (1.05)***  (1.29)***








R-Squared  0.474  0.577  0.443  0.457
No. of Observations  54  54  54  54
Note: t-statistics  are in parentheses;  * indicates  significant  at the 1% level,  ** at the 5% level, and *  at the 10%  level.
All the coefficients for CON are positive and their tests statistically significant. This suggests that the
general adherence of society to the rule of law may in fact have an effect lowering budget deficits. We of
course cannot be certain exactly how this  occurs. One possibility which we  suggested above is that, in
countries where adherence is weak, there will be a greater tendency to circumvent what ostensibly are good
budgetary rules, or worse, to purposely avoid establishing  such rules. Another possibility is that CON actually
reflects the taxing capacity of the country. Countries in which the rule of law is weak are likely to have very
weak capacity partly because the transactions  costs of collecting taxes is high and partly because of the lack of
accountability of tax administration  officials. Under any of these circumstances,  fiscal management is likely to
be poor.] 7
The signs of the coefficients for the political instability variable, POL, run counter to what we predicted.
They indicate that increased  political instability leads to smaller deficits. But the t-tests for these coefficients
are mostly insignificant.  These results are not surprising given the nature of the variable POL. POL measures
instability in terms of irregular changes in government, i.e. coups and assassinations,  but what may be more
relevant is the turnover of government  whether regular or irregular.  Using an index based on irregular changes,
16  At the highest  value  of FP (which is 7), the absolute  value  of a 3 FP is lower across  most of the regressions.
17 Roubini (1991) uses  GDP percapita to capture  this  effect. We think CON is abetter measure.
43Roubini (1991) found essentially the same thing-"wrong"  sign and insignificant t tests.18 But using another
index which basically measured the rate of tumover of regimes, he did find that political instability reduces
deficits. Roubini and Sachs (1989) also provide empirical evidence that the rate of tumover is important in
explaining the pattern of deficits in the OECD countries. Taking this cue, we ran the same four regressions
with a different instability  index, POL2 based on the data set of Bienen and van de Walle (1991). POL2 refers
to the number of chief executives the country has had over the last seven years (including the current year).  19
The more chief executives there are over the period, the more unstable  the country is during the given year. In
contrast  to the previous measure, POL2 reflects the fact that instability does not go away instantaneously. The
results are shown in Table A-3. POL2 has the expected sign-greater  instability leads to larger deficits-but
the t-test is significant  only for the APTAP based model, i.e. (2) in Table A-3. The basic results do not change
for the remaining  variables.
The signs of the coefficients for the growth rate variable G are negative in all eight regressions which is
inconsistent  with what one would expect.  But most of the t-tests were also highly insignificant.  Closer scrutiny
indicated that the impact of the growth rate may likely have been reflected  already in the variable INT. Recall
that INT is defined as PDx(R* - G). In all eight regressions,  lNT has a negative sign, as predicted, and the t-
Table A-3. Dependent Variable:  Deficits as Percent of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  -3.988  -2.845  -4.443  -4.431
(-1.28)***  (-0.95)  (-1.41)***  (-1.38)***
G  -0.095  -0.139  -0.082  -0.083
(-0.85)  (-1.30)**  (-0.73)  (-0.72)
INT  -0.009  -0.009  -0.01  -0.01
(-4.11)*  (-4.22)*  (-4.17)*  (-4.12)*
CON  1.469  1.196  1.373  1.366
(1.17)****  (0.33)  (1.07)****  (1.05)****
POL2  -0.12  -0.267  -0.073  -0.076
(-0.57)  (-1.28)***  (-0.34)  (-0.35)








R-Squared  0.531  0.584  0.516  0.511
No. of Observations  51  51  51  51
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses; * indicates significant at the 1%  level, **  at the 5% level, and ***  at the 10% level, and
*  at the 15%  level.
18 we substituted  the Barro  index (1991)  for socio-political  instability  which is essentially  a weighted  average  of the number of coups
and assassinations.  The results were  no different.
19 We chose  a seven  year period  because  this is the maximum  constitutionally  set presidential  term that we found  among the  countries  in
the sample.  We tried another  version  of POL2  which uses  a shorter  time  period,  four  instead  of seven.  we essentially  got the same results.
44tests are  highly significant. Hence, (PD x  G), which  is highly correlated with G,  has  a  positive sign.
Recognizing this,  we  re-ran four additional regressions without the  growth rate variable and  with the
alternative political instability variable POL2. The results are presented in Table A4.  The coefficients of all
the variables are of the expected sign and all the t-tests are significant except for the ICAPALP financial
openness index and its corresponding  interaction term.
Because of the limited number of observations  we could use with the APTALP and ICAPALP indices, we
decided to try another index, the (absolute value) of the uncovered interest parity, UIP. We were able to
calculate this for several more countries which gave us a larger number of observations-133  as opposed to
54. We ran two regressions with the growth variable and the original index for political instability (POL) and
another two regressions without  the growth variable and with the alternative political instability index (POL2).
In all cases, the signs for the coefficients of UIP and the interaction term were as predicted and the tests
significant. In the latter two regressions, the remaining variables had the correct sign and their t-tests were
significant.
Finally, we note that in all the regressions,  INT has a negative coefficient and the corresponding t-tests are
highly significant. We are not sure why this is the case. We would have expected a positive sign. The obvious
interpretation is that the sustainability thesis simply does not hold. But then it could be that the variable is
simply capturing  the effect of an increased interest burden. If it is the latter then a possible solution would be
to use the primary deficit (% of GDP) as the dependent variable. Data limitations  precluded us from pursuing
this line of inquiry.
Table A-4. Dependent Variable: Deficits as Percent of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Constant  -5.145  -4.612  -5.435  -5.435
(-1.85)**  (-1.71)**  (-1.89)**  (-1.89)**
fNT  -0.008  -0.007  -0.008  -0.009
(-5.27)*  (-4.76)*  (-5.47)*  (-5.47)*
CON  1.732  1.599  1.607  1.607
(1.43)***  (1.37)***  (1.28)***  (1.28)***
POL2  -0.141  -0.282  -0.09  -0.092
(-0.68)  (-1.34)***  (-0.42)  (-0.42)








R-Squared  0.524  0.568  0.505  (-0.01)
No. of Observations  51  51  51  51
Note: t-statistics  are in parentheses;  * indicates  significant  at the 1% level,  *  at the 5% level, and  e  at the 10% level,  and
*  at the 15%  level.
45Concluding Comments
The results of our empirical  analysis need to be interpreted  with caution. As we have mentioned several times,
because of problems with getting  data, we worked with a small number of countries and observations. A larger
sample size may conceivably reverse our findings. However we note that in practically all our regressions
(including those which we did not present or discuss) the coefficients of the financial openness indices ( all
three) all had the same sign, negative, which is consistent  with our expectations.  Given the data problems, the
t-tests may not be all that informative.  But the robustness of the signs suggests to us that our hypotheses about
financial openness and the press should not be easily dismissed and that further work on this issue should be
encouraged.
This Annex makes preliminary inroads in investigating  the potential  role open financial  markets and a free
press can play in instilling fiscal discipline.  More work needs to be done to confirm its findings. First of all, a
structural (theoretical) model that links openness with other macro variables including the deficit needs to be
developed. This way an empirically  testable  model based on a coherent theoiy can be constructed.  If this is not
possible then the next best approach is to construct an ad hoc empirical model which incorporates various
versions of the openness indices and control variables  (or their equivalents)  which have so far been used in the
literature. In either case, additional data on the  indicators for financial openness has to be  collected to
incorporate more countries, create a longer time series, and thus have a much large number of observations.
This can easily be done for the first index, UIP, but considerably  more work will be required for the other two
indices. The freedom of the press index needs to be refined since the Gastil index is an indicator of a
composite of freedoms. Extending the time series on political instability that Bienen and van de Walle (1991)
have gathered to the 1990s will probably  provide better information  since the period beginning the late eighties
witnessed considerably more  activity  on  financial liberalization in  developing countries. 20 Indices  for
budgetary  institutions  may in fact be important  and so also need to be developed. 21 And finally, the dependent
variable, fiscal deficits (as % of GDP) has to include non-central government expenditures and preferably
should reflect only the non-interest component. All these point to the need  for further, more  extensive
research.
20 For most countries,  the time series  ends  in 1985.
21 Part  of the difficulty with any index  of budgetary  institutions  is that it is difficult to construct  one for the past. These  indices,  including
that currently being developed  by Campos  and Pradhan  (1995), are  based  on questionnaires  which experts  are  asked to answer.  Recalling  the
past  creates  difficulties for the experts  and thus  problems  for the index.
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Results of Unweighted Indices
Figure B-1. New Zealand
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47Figure  B-2.  Australia
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48Figure B-3. Thailand
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49Figure  B-4.  Africa
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50Annex C
Institutional Arrangements and Their Index Parameters
Institutional arrangements  Accountability  Transparency
I. Aggregate  flscal  discipline
A. Existence  of macro  framework  Ex-post  reconciliation  aggregate  Results  are
of actual  vs. ex -ante  spending/
deficit
No  0  No  0  Not Published  0
Yes  Yes  I  Published  0.5
Non Consistent  Published  and made  public  I
Annual  .I
Med.  Term  .3
Consistent
Annual  0.5
Med.  Term  I
B. Dominance  of central  ministries
(%  deviation  between  total  spending  as  Are  ministers  of finance  and/or  Results  are
proposed  by the central  ministries  vs.  planning  under  a performance
approved)  contract?
>20%  Low  0  No  0  Not published  0
11-20%  Med  0.5  Yes  with  Published  0.5
0-10%High  I  Weak  sanctions  0.5  Published  and made  public  I
Strong  sanctions  I
C. Formal  constraint  on spending  Ex-post  reconciliation  of actuals  Results  are
and borrowing
No  0  vs. targets  Not published  0
Implicit  0.5  None  0  Published  0.5
Explicit  I  Yes  0.5  Published  and made  public  I
Yes  w/ sanctions  I
D. Hard budget  constraints  on line  Ex-post  reconciliation  of over  Results  are
ministries  and local gov'ts  expenditures
No  0  None  0  Not published  0
Yes  I  Yes  Published  0.5
W/o Sanctions  0.5  Published  and made  public  I
W/ Sanctions  I
E. Comprehensiveness  of budget
1.  Are local  gov't expenditures  included  in the budget?
No  0
Yes
2. Is financial  support  for public enterprises
No  0
Yes  I
51Institutional  arrangements  Accountability  Transparency
3. Extra Budgetary  Funds
(as  a % of total expenditures)
Low ( less  than  5%)  0
Medium ( 6% - 15%)  0.5
High (greater  than 15%)  1
II. Prioritization  of expenditure  composition
A. Allocations  linked  to strategic outcomes
1. Is there a process  for articulation  Are outcomes reported?  Results are
of strategic outcomes?
No  0  No  0  Not published  0
National Plan  0.2  Yes  I  Published  .33
Intermediate Outcomes  0.6  Published and made  public  .67
Program Level Outcomes  I  Made public and  I
comprehensible
Are there ex-post  evaluations?  Results are
No  0  Not published  0
Yes  0.5  Published  .33
Yes with  sanctions  I  Published and made public  .67
Made  public and  I
comprehensible
2. What is the expenditure  Correlation of forward estimates  Results are
planning horizon?  w/budget allocations?*
Less than a year  0  Low (<20%)  0  Not published  0
One year  0.5  Med (21-75%)  0.5  Published  0.5
Medium term (3 -5 years)  I  Hi (>75%)  I  Published and made  public  I
Is there ex-post  reconciliation of  Results are
forward estimates with annual
budget bids?
No  0  Not  published  0
Yes  I  Published  0.5
Published and made  public  I
(*Forward estimates refer to medium term  projections of expenditure allocations  by each line agency  across
their own respective program projects)
3. Discussion of competing  priorities  Is there an aggregate hard budget
constraint?
a. Are competing priorities identified?
No  0  No  0
Yes  I  Yes  I
b. Is there cabinet review of  Are outcomes reported?  Results are
competing priorities
None  0  No  0  Not published  0
Limited  0.5  Yes  I  Published  0.5
Extensive  I  Published and  made  public  I
52Institutional  arrangements  Accountability  Transparency
B. Existence  of consultation  mechanisms
I. With Parliament  Does  Parliament  have and
adequate  technical  support  staff?
No  0  No  0
Yes  I  Yes  I
Are  actual  allocations  reconciled




2. Broader  consultations  with  Are actual  allocations  reconciled Results  are
civil  society  with  those  discussed  in
consultation?
No  0  No  0  Not  published  0
Limited  0.5  Yes  I  Published  .33
Yes  I  Published  and made  public  .67
Made  public  and  I
comprehensible
3. Are  there opinion  surveys?  Are  actual  allocations  reconciled Results  are
with  those discussed  in
consultation?
No  0  No  0  Not published  0
Yes  Yes  I  Published  .33
Irregular  0.5  Published  and made  public  .67
Regular  I  Made  public  and  I
comprehensible




I. What  % of expenditures  do line  Are  outcomes  reported?
agcncies  have  control  over?
Low (0-10%)  0  No  0
Med (I 1-50%)  0.5  Yes  I
High  (>50%)  1
Are there  ex-post  evaluations?
No  0
Yes  I
2. Identification  of new spending  Are  outcomes  reported?
and  cutbacks  on existing  programs
No  0  No  0
Yes  1  Yes  I
Are there  ex-post  evaluations?
No  0
Yes  1
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D. Comprehensiveness  of budget
1.  Are  the  recurrent  expenditures  Are  actual  expenditures  on 0 &  Results  are
and  capital  budgets  M reconciled  with  estimates
based  on  existing  capital  stock
& new  investment
Segmented  0  No  0  Not  published  0
Integrated  I  Yes  I  Published  0.5
Published  and  made  public  I
2. Are  there  extrabudgetary  funds?  What  % of  total  expenditures? Information  is
Yes  0  >15%  High  0  Not  published  0
No  1  6-15%  Med  0.33  Published  0.5
1-5%  Low  0.67  Published  and  made  public  I
0%  none  I
3. What  is  the  extent  of earmarking?
(as  % of  expenditures)
High  (greater  than  20%/6)  0
Med (6% - 20%)  0.5
Low  (less  than  5%)  1
E. Allocations  based  on economic  analysis
Are there  systematic  and  objective  0  Information  is
criteria used  in evaluating
competing  priorities?
(% of total expenditures)  Not published  0
0-5%  0  Published  0.5
6-10%  0.25  Published  and  made  public  I
10  -15%  0.5
16-25%  0.75
>25%
Ill.  Technical  Efficiency
A. Civil service  compensation
(% differential between  private  and  public sector)
1.  Senior  Management  Performance  based  recruitment  Compensation
and  promotion
<40%  I  No  0  Not published  0
41-70% Med  0.5  Yes  Published  0.5
>70% High  0  Some  Agencies  0.5  Published  and  made  public  I
All Agencies  I  Recruitment  and  promotion
Not published  0
Published  0.5
Published  and  made  public  I
2. Entry level  professional  Performance  based  recruitment  Compensation
and  promotion
<40%  1  No  0  Not  publishec  0
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41-70% Med  0.5  Yes  Published  0.5
>70% High  0  Some Agencies  0.5  Published and made public  I
All Agencies  I  Recruitment and promotion
Not published  0
Published  0.5
Published and made public  I
B. Relative autonomy of line agencies
I . What % of expenditures do line
agencies have control over?
Low (0-10%)  0
Med (11-50%)  0.5
High (>50%)  1
2.  Does the head of an agency have  Performance based recruitment  Oversight by Civil Service
the authority to hire and fire?  and promotion  Conmmission
No  0  No  0  No  0
Yes  I  Yes  Yes  I
Intemal  competition  0
Extemal competition  I
3. Predictability of expenditure allocations to line ministries
A. Within annual budget
(% of allocated expenditures line agencies can be certain of getting)
Low (>50%)  0
Med( 10-49%)  0.5
Hi (<10%)
B. Over medium term
(% difference b/w forward estimates  and actual budget allocations)
Low (>50%)  0
Med (10-49%)  0.5
Hi (<10%)
C. Accountability
I. Tenure of agency head  Recruitment and promotion  Degree of open competition
based on performance
Pemnanent  0  No  0  None  0
Temporary  I  Yes  I  Intemal (w/in gov't)  0.5
External*  I
(* Open to the public)
2. Are there financial accounts  Published?  Made public?
No  0  No  0  No  0.5
Yes  I  If so, with what lag?  Yes  I
>2 yrs  0.1
1-2 yrs  0.3
3 mos.- I yr  0.8
<3mos  1
55Institutional  arrangements  Accountability  Transparency
3. Are financial audits undertaken?  Published?  Made public?
No  0  No  0  No  0.5
Yes  I  If so, with what lag?  Yes  I
>2 yrs  0.1
1-2 yrs  0.3
3 mos.- I yr  0.8
<3mos  I
4. Are performance audits undertaken?  Published?  Made public?
No  0  No  0  No  0.5
Yes  I  If so, with what lag?  Yes  I
0  >2 yrs  0.1
1-2 yrs  0.3
0.1  3 mos.- I yr  0.8
0.4  c3  mos  I
5. Do line agencies undertake client surveys  I  Published?  Made public?
No  0  1  No  0  No  0.5
Yes  If so, with what lag?  Yes  I
Irregular  0.5  >2 yrs  0.1
Regular  I  1-2 yrs  0.3
3 mos.- I yr  0.8
3mos  1
6. Are outputs of line agencies explicitly defined?
(for what % of agencies)
Lo (lcss than 10%)  0
Mcd (I 1%  - 50%)  0.5
High (greater than 50%)  1
7. Are there rules for procurement?
No  0  Auditing (% of procurement)  Open bidding (% procurement.)
Ycs  I  None  0  No  0
Svstematic  0-10% Low  0.1
0-10% Low  0.1  1  1-50%Med  0.4
11-50% Med  0.4  >50% High  I
>50% High  I
Random  I
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